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SACEUR offers scholars a unique look into the founding years of NATO and the beginning of 
European unification. Using Kenneth Burke’s theory of the four master tropes, I analyze how 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty to form the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Article 5 of the treaty declared that "an armed attack 
against one or more of [the NATO countries] in Europe or North America” would be 
“considered an attack against them all,” but the Alliance was not well-prepared to execute that 
mandate.1 Troop shortages and a lack of both equipment and centralized command structure left 
the overall defense of Western Europe to a few scattered, regional committees.2 While the legal 
alliance existed because of the North Atlantic Treaty, the physical alliance had not taken shape. 
A command structure and centralized leadership were still needed in order to form a cohesive, 
unified military coalition to stand against the potential military threat of the Soviet Union and 
communist ideology.  
With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the NATO member countries feared 
the Soviets would attempt to push the “Iron Curtain” westward while the United States (US) was 
preoccupied with Asia.3 Little more than a year after signing the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
Alliance agreed to enhance their defense efforts in response to the fear of Soviet expansion.4 
They began taking steps to build NATO’s integrated military command structure under a single 
command in Europe. In order to begin building said command, the selection of the Supreme 
                                                           
1 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Online, 9 Dec. 2008. Accessed 4 Oct. 2011 < 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.  
2 Each “Regional Planning Group” was charged with creating defense plans for their particular region. 
3 One of the most well-known metaphors during Eisenhower’s tenure as SACEUR, the “Iron Curtain,” was coined 
by Winston Churchill’s 1946 “Sinews of Peace” address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.” The speech 
gave the “first authoritative public utterance to many of the leading political and ideological themes of the coming 
Cold War,” including the ideological split between the democratic west and the communist east. Communication 
scholars Boyd Lynn Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. came to agree with Eisenhower’s assumption that 
Churchill’s speech would eventually be marked as important. They noted that Churchill’s speech “sowed the seeds 
for a rhetorical process that was to blossom into a new world order, a new political reality.” See The Cold War 
Rhetoric (Praeger: New York, 1991). 
4 Gregory W. Pedlow, “The Evolution of NATO’s Command Structure, 1951-2009,” NATO Unclassified, Web. 
Accessed 15 Sep. 2011 <www.aco.nato.int>. 
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Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the man who would command all of NATO’s military 
forces in Europe, would be a delicate task. NATO needed someone that was respected by both 
Americans and Europeans. They needed a man experienced in bringing together diverse groups 
of soldiers. Only one person fit this bill, and in 1950, US President Harry Truman called on 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the man who led the Allied forces to victory during World War 
II (WWII), to serve as the fledgling SACEUR for NATO forces.  
On January 1, 1951, Eisenhower arrived in Europe as SACEUR to find a dismal 
situation. He had minimal staff and no troops under his command. Europe had barely begun to 
recover from WWII, and the European countries committed to NATO had little more than a 
dozen military divisions available for ground combat should the Soviet Union, with more than 
175 military divisions, decide to mount an attack against them.5 The Soviet’s 175 military 
divisions were easily and quickly expandable to 300 divisions, backed by 40,000 tanks and 
tactical aircrafts; as a comparison, the German’s maintained 250 divisions during WWII, and that 
was not enough to hold back the Normandy invasion.6 While the European and US governments 
found funding and troops to bolster their forces, Eisenhower’s task was largely rhetorical. He 
needed to enhance morale among the European nations, reminding them, “Never again must 
there be a campaign of liberation fought on these shores.”7 During the next year and a half of his 
appointment as SACEUR, Eisenhower traveled around Europe, focusing much of his efforts on 
the political elite in Britain and France. While Western Europe’s political leaders knew freedom 
                                                           
5 See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 254. Also 
see Andrew J. Goodpaster, “The Development of SHAPE: 1950-1953,” International Organization, 9 (1955): 259. 
Ambrose claims NATO had 12 military divisions available while Goodpaster cites 14. Regardless, Ambrose (an 
Eisenhower scholar) and Colonel Goodpaster (a graduate of West Point with military staff assignments with the 
Pentagon and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) both agree on the 175 divisions available to the 
Soviets. As a testament to Eisenhower’s leadership and importance to NATO, by 1953, the year after Eisenhower 
left NATO and won the US presidency, forces delegated strictly to NATO increased fourfold.  
6 Charles J. V. Murphy, “The War We May Fight,” Life, May 28, 1951. 
7 Ibid. 256.  
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from communist control and Soviet expansion were in their best interest, Eisenhower needed to 
convince them that the best way to maintain that freedom was through unification with other 
European nations and joint military action. Joint military action included the rearmament of 
Western Germany. Gradually, Eisenhower would convince political leadership to commit forces 
for the combined defense of Europe.8 Eisenhower was in a unique position to make these calls to 
action to Western Europe based on his prevalent leadership role during the WWII Battle of 
Normandy and other WWII operations with Allied forces. He was an accomplished soldier and 
leader, admired by his peers and the people he helped protect during WWII.9 
Apart from his task of conjuring morale and military force, Eisenhower had to work 
against fears of US hegemony in Europe. The appointment of an American Supreme Commander 
meant European defense was under the control of the US, and this could have posed a grave 
threat to the “European spirit.”10 In response to fears of American hegemony, Eisenhower 
worked harder to bring people together.11 In his role as SACEUR, Eisenhower was a strong 
proponent of global equality and European unity. This was one of the many reasons NATO 
ultimately established a stronghold in Europe and built the foundation for the international 
organization it is today. Tropes allowed Eisenhower to make his call for European unity, and 
they help shed light on his unique ability to use specific metaphors, irony, synecdoche and 
metonymy to specific audiences to create a persuasive call to action. 
Historians of the founding years of NATO and the beginning stages of European 
unification recognize Eisenhower’s role as the first SACEUR, but they ignore the importance of 
his rhetoric in helping to foster a sense of unity and cooperation among the Western European 
                                                           
8 See footnote 3 concerning Eisenhower’s success increasing the number of committed troops.  
9 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President. 
10 Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 146. 
11 Richard Crable, “Ike: Identification, Argument, and Paradoxical Appeal,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (1977): 
192.  
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nations. Moreover, critics have often characterized Eisenhower’s presidential rhetoric as that of a 
speaker lacking the “energy, motivation and political know-how to have a significant impact on 
events” during the 1950s; Eisenhower was viewed as a “good-natured bumbler” who lacked 
leadership qualities.12  Eisenhower was also well-known for mixing metaphors during his time in 
the White House.13 However, this was not the case with his rhetoric during his time as SACEUR. 
Eisenhower’s rhetoric, reviewed in conjunction with the specific context of his role in WWII and 
the beginning of the Cold War, was an important factor in the development and strength of 
NATO that has been ignored by historians and rhetoricians alike.14 Critical rhetorical analysis of 
Eisenhower’s time as SACEUR, taking into account the context surrounding his role, offers 
scholars a unique look into the developing years of NATO and the beginnings of European 
unification. This is because historians typically look at matters external to discourse, while 
                                                           
12 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1981): 5. While 
Greenstein is reviewing previous studies and commentaries on Eisenhower’s presidential rhetoric, this is an 
important discussion to note. Until recently, Eisenhower was seen as non-strategic and apolitical in relation to his 
public address and political dealings. Moreover, he was commonly seen as a person who frequently mixed 
metaphors, or used them incorrectly, throughout his presidency. Greenstein makes the argument that even if 
Eisenhower did mix metaphors or use seemingly non-strategic or apolitical rhetoric, it was for a particular reason, 
and therefore, strategic.  
13 Mixed metaphors are those that have a vehicle and tenor term that do not match or make sense.  A notable mixed 
metaphor during Eisenhower’s presidency included his reference to Joseph McCartney as “a pimple on the path of 
progress,” during a call to the Republican National Committee in March 1954. See Jim Newton, Eisenhower: The 
White House Years (New York: Random House, 2011):123. 
14 There are only two exceptions to the general statement that rhetorical scholars have mainly ignored General 
Eisenhower’s rhetoric. First, Halford Ross Ryan’s 1972 dissertation from the University of Illinois, “A Rhetorical 
Analysis of General Eisenhower's Public Speaking from 1945 to 1951,” discussed Eisenhower’s rhetoric directly 
before he became SACEUR. The dissertation was never published outside the university, and it did not result in the 
publication of any work based on Eisenhower’s rhetoric as a general. Second, Ira Chernus’s 1999 article, 
“Eisenhower and the Soviets, 1945-1947: Rhetoric and Policy,” and 2002 book, General Eisenhower: Ideology and 
Discourse. In the 1999 article, Chernus concluded that Eisenhower’s “new discourse of peace was the ultimate 
legacy of Eisenhower’s postwar rhetoric and policy,” and future scholars should consider “how much of that legacy 
still shapes public rhetoric and public policy in the United States today.” He also noted a distinct difference in tone 
between Eisenhower’s private rhetoric and his public rhetoric. Privately, Eisenhower cast the Soviet Union as a 
great threat while he publically promoted a collaborative relationship between the US and the Soviets. The main 
premise of General Eisenhower is to trace Eisenhower’s private and public rhetoric during the ten-year span of 1942 
through 1952. See Halford Ross Ryan, “A Rhetorical Analysis of General Eisenhower's Public Speaking from 1945 
to 1951.”  Dissertation. University of Illinois, 1972; also see Ira Chernus, “Eisenhower and the Soviets, 1945-1947,” 
59-82; and General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002). 
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rhetoricians review the discourse itself.15 Historians have penned numerous biographies and 
histories of Eisenhower and NATO, and rhetoricians have examined key speeches during 
Eisenhower’s long military and political career. However, none have reviewed how 
Eisenhower’s experiences during WWII, the political atmosphere in Europe leading into 1950, 
and well-established persuasive abilities created an orator that played a much larger role in the 
formation of NATO and the early years of European unity than simply acting as an appointed 
military commander.16 
Using Kenneth Burke’s description of the four master tropes, I will discuss how 
Eisenhower’s role in the development of NATO, especially the development of their military 
arm in Europe, was an important milestone in the eventual development of a unified Europe. One 
of the largest barriers to this unification was getting Europe to consider the establishment of the 
European defense community. Eisenhower would overcome this barrier by convincing France, 
Britain and the remainder of Western Europe that the most effective way to avoid Soviet and 
communist expansion was through a united military force, including Western Germany. Through 
public address, he would persuade the NATO countries that a unified, European military effort 
was the best way to maintain their national sovereignty and freedom during the 1950s. 
In the 1950 edition of A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke discussed persuasion in public 
address.17 As Bryan Crable noted, Burke’s discussion in Rhetoric suggests that identification was 
                                                           
15 Stephen E. Lucas, “The Schism in Rhetorical Scholarship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 67 (1981): 5. 
16 For a discussion of Eisenhower’s explicit and strategic use of arguments and persuasive tactics, see Martin J. 
Medhurst, “Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language,” 
Communication Monographs, 54 (1987): 204-220. 
17 Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press,1969).  In his introduction, Burke 
clearly meant for “identification” to be the takeaway of this text, noting, “We emerge from the analysis with the key 
term, ‘Identification,’” (xiii). The first hardback edition of the book was released in 1950, with the first paperback 
edition entering circulation in 1962. A Rhetoric of Motives was meant to be the second in a trilogy of works focused 
on different aspects of rhetoric; the other two included his already published Grammar of Motives and another 
volume he never completely produced that he intended to title Symbolic of Motives. He did later publish Language 
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“inseparably intertwined” with two particular aspects of rhetoric: public address and 
persuasion.18 Burke noted that rhetoric, by necessity, is addressed to another person or group of 
people.19 As a result, “the realistic use of addressed language was to induce action in people” 
through persuasion.20 Speakers persuade audiences by getting them to identify with the speaker’s 
interests.21 Meanwhile, the speaker begins to identify with the audience by emphasizing a 
common interest and forming a certain rapport with that audience. In short, Burke blurred the 
lines between the definitions of persuasion, identification and communication in his articles and 
published lectures. For Burke, language is identification and identification is persuasion. He 
noted that there were times when “one or another of these elements may serve best for extending 
a line of analysis in some particular direction.”22 In the case of Eisenhower, the SACEUR needed 
to establish a legitimate reason for the formation of a unified European defense against the 
Soviets and persuade his toughest audience, the British and French, to view his position 
favorably. Eisenhower employed various tropes within his SACEUR rhetoric in an attempt to 
persuade his European audiences that German rearmament was the key ingredient for a strong 
and successful European defense community. To accomplish his instrumental goal, the creation 
of a unified European coalition, Eisenhower had to accomplish his constitutive goal, the 
development of a shared sense of identity between the various countries of Europe.  
Eisenhower’s use of key master tropes allow me to trace how his rhetoric strategically 
persuaded Britain and France, countries afraid of losing their sovereignty should they join 
NATOs military efforts, that they needed to come together in order to position NATO as a the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as Symbolic Action in 1966. Instead of being a completed volume, it was a collection of essays best known for the 
“man is a symbol-using animal” remark for which Burke is well-known. 
18 Bryan Crable, “Distance as Ultimate Motive: A Dialectical Interpretation of A Rhetoric of Motives.” Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly, 39.3 (2009): 224. 
19 Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 38. 
20 Ibid. 42. Emphasis in source. 
21 Ibid. 46. 
22 Ibid. 
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foundation of a strong, international alliance and support a unified European military effort. 
Tropes allowed Eisenhower to help his audience associate European unification as the essential 
foundation to a more secure Europe (metaphor), reduce the Soviet and communist threat to a 
hostile and menacing gun in the back (synecdoche), emphasize the opposing philosophies of the 
Soviets versus the NATO countries (irony), and associate the Soviets with representations of 
Hitler’s Germany (metonymy).23 In sum, Eisenhower’s use of tropes allowed him to “control the 
processes of defining issues” to effectively persuade his key audiences, the French and the 
British, and reveal the “truth” about the Soviet threat and the urgency of European unity under 
the guidance of NATO.24 
1.1 Burke’s Master Tropes 
In 1941, Burke published “Four Master Tropes” in John Crowe Ransom’s Kenyon  
Review. He identified the key tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony.25 Each of the 
four tropes usually went by a different name: metaphor as perspective, metonymy as reduction, 
synecdoche as representation and irony as dialectic.26 For rhetoricians, there are three options for 
understanding the significance of tropes in public speaking and persuasion: (1) The rhetorician 
                                                           
23 Burke’s tropes were chosen as a focal point for this study out of a myriad of other rhetorical methodologies for 
two reasons. First, of the options of Burkean theory, Dramatism did not allow me to delve deep enough into why 
Eisenhower was uniquely positioned to effectively utilize specific persuasive language techniques. Within the 
upcoming context and analysis chapters, I already identify the agency, act, scene, purpose and agent without 
explicitly naming them. However, by focusing on which of these pentadic terms was the most dominant would not 
have allowed me to focus on the most important and overlooked piece of Eisenhower’s role as SACEUR: his 
rhetoric. Second, of all the other rhetorical methodologies available, I did not want to utilize a methodology that 
focused on revealing an underlying ideology or power structure; I was not trying to establish a genre or map key 
terminology with Eisenhower’s rhetoric. I wanted to critically review how Eisenhower was interpreting the context 
around him, the “facts,” in order to effectively reshape public perception to see that there was no alternative to 
building a unified coalition in order to prevent another war. Tropes were the most useful and insightful rhetorical 
tools to achieve this goal. Benjamin R. Bates used metaphors in a similar way. See “Audiences, metaphors, and the 
Persian Gulf War,” Communication Studies, 55, (2004): 447-63. 
24 Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, “The Battle of Issues and Images: Establishing Interpretive 
Dominance,” Communication Quarterly, 42 (1994): 121. 
25 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” Kenyon Review, 3 (1941): 421-438. While Burke is not credited for 
coining these tropes, he is one of the most influential scholars to draw attention to the tropes in the field of rhetoric 
and is most relevant to this study.  
26 Ibid., 421.  
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sees tropes as ornaments, or as useful ways of saying something that could have otherwise been 
said using direct language; (2) the rhetorician understands tropes as a “range of associations that 
cohere around a signifier,” such as “the tropes of war;”27 or (3) the rhetorician views tropes as an 
“epistemological category,” seeking to account for the role of tropes in the process of 
discovering and describing “the truth.”28 The third option, taken from Burke’s Grammar of 
Motives, best describes the way in which the master tropes are viewed in this thesis.29  
Metaphor 
 Burke saw metaphor as a “device for seeing something in terms of something else,” and 
he draws some of the support for this statement from the early twentieth century, when I.A. 
Richards wrote Philosophy of Rhetoric. 30 Richards discussed the nature of the metaphor within 
rhetorical literary studies and developed the tenor-vehicle model in which the speaker helps the 
audience see the tenor term, or the term about which the metaphor is asserting something, in 
relation to the vehicle term, or the term which transfers meaning from another context.31 This can 
be useful, because it can help the speaker assist his or her audience in better understanding an 
unfamiliar concept as it relates to a more familiar concept. An example would be “Tom is a pig,” 
in which “Tom” is the tenor term and “pig” is the vehicle term. Even if the speaker’s intended 
audience does not know Tom, they are likely familiar with the concept of a pig, a dirty farm 
animal. The speaker helps the audience understand that Tom is a dirty person.  
                                                           
27 See George Lakoff  and Michael Johnson,  Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); 
and also see Robert L. Ivie’s analysis of the metaphor of “force” in pro war discourse, focusing his analysis on the 
War of 1812 in “The Metaphor of Force in Pro war Discourse: The Case of 1812,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68 
(1982): 240-253.  
28 Christian Lundberg, “Enjoying God’s Death: The Passion of the Christ and the Practices of an Evangelical 
Public,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 95 (2009): 389.  
29 Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989): 503. 
30 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” 421. 
31 Douwe Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About the Mind, Trans. Paul Vincent (Great Britain: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995): 11. 
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In addition to making the unfamiliar familiar, metaphors are most effective if the 
audience can buy into the speaker’s comparison as “true” or acceptable. Michael Osborn and 
Douglas Ehninger discussed how the metaphor functioned in relation to discourse; the “metaphor 
of the orator” was not just a “category of thought” but “an ornament of style.”32 If scholars were 
to take into account the meaningfulness of a metaphor, the audience needed to be considered, 
because a metaphor was both a stimulus and mental response. As stimulus, the metaphor 
identifies an idea or object through a sign which generally stood for an entirely different idea or 
object. As mental response, the metaphor is the interaction of the audience’s own thoughts and 
the contexts surrounding the time the metaphor is used.33 Therefore, if the audience can accept a 
metaphor as literal or true over a prolonged period of time, the more influential and persuasive 
the metaphor. The metaphor only loses its persuasive effect when the audience begins to believe 
it is a false representation. 
Finally, apart from choosing metaphors that can be accepted as literal and sustained over 
time, Eisenhower also used the same or similar metaphors repeatedly. Arthur Hastings discussed 
the importance of maintaining the metaphor throughout the entirety of the discourse, and in 
Eisenhower’s case, this meant his tenure as SACEUR. Hastings claimed the imposition of a 
specific frame of reference on an audience member helps to establish an “identity structure” in 
which the audience can be “controlled,” because the speaker has found a way to make the 
metaphor rewarding for the audience.34 A metaphor is considered rewarding when an audience 
can relate to it in some way. For example, if a conservative political candidate spoke to an 
audience in a rural, Christian Alabama town, he could compare his economic policy to the Ten 
Commandments in order to garner support. If that same candidate spoke to a group of non-
                                                           
32 Michael Osborn and Douglas Ehninger, "The Metaphor in Public Address," Speech Monographs, 29 (1962): 223. 
33 Ibid. 225-226. 
34 Arthur Hastings, “Metaphor in Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication, 34 (1970): 182-183. 
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religious individuals, such a metaphor would either be ignored or mean very little, and some 
could even find it offensive. This means it is important for a speaker to have a clear 
characterization of his or her audience before deploying metaphors. The speaker must know what 
tenor and associate vehicle terms will be most acceptable to the audience. Max Black’s concept 
of a “system of associated commonplaces” aligned with the vehicle term of a metaphor. When a 
metaphor is deployed, the vehicle term, and the ideas or objects connected with it, organize the 
audience’s view of the tenor term.35 The greater the number of associated ideas or objects, the 
greater the chance the audience could identify with the metaphor.  
For Eisenhower, metaphors created clear connections between his message and his 
audience, pulling from contextual references that made his points clear and concise. Eisenhower 
sustained select metaphors throughout his tenure as SACEUR, making them more influential and 
more persuasive over time for his French and British audiences. Sustained metaphors can be 
more effective, because the more often Eisenhower said the unification of Europe was the 
foundation for a strong wall of defense against the already-feared Soviet and communist 
aggression, the more he could make his case that European unity under NATO was the only way 
to avoid losing freedom. Apart from linking European unity to positive representations through 
metaphor, Eisenhower also emphasized the difference between the Soviets and the NATO 
countries through the use of a second trope, irony, augmenting the need for strong military force 
and increasing the sense of urgency to act before it was too late to deter an invasion.  
 
 
 
                                                           
35 Max Black, “Metaphor,” Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1981): 73-75. 
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Irony 
 For Burke, “irony demands a fundamental kinship with the enemy,” because it involves 
the pairing of two dialectics.36 According to Burke, “Irony arises when one tries, by the 
interaction of terms upon one another, to produce development which uses all the terms.”37 He 
references it as a “perspective of perspectives,” in which none of the “sub-perspectives” can be 
labeled as completely correct or completely incorrect.38 An example that explains Burke’s 
description of irony is the hero/villain dialectic. A person could ironically make a statement 
about how the villain functions to ultimately strengthen the hero. In one sense, the villain gives 
the hero a reason to protect others, but the villain can also harm the hero, involving him/her in 
physical battles or worse. The statement is neither right nor wrong, because irony is created 
when meanings work in opposition to one another.39  
 In “Four Master Tropes,” Burke sets apart two distinct forms of irony available to a 
speaker: romantic irony and dialectic or “true” irony. He said romantic irony has the danger of 
relativism,40  and it constitutes a particular kind of paradox.41 It is a reversal of expectations. In 
romantic irony, a term is restated in a way that it no longer appears to mean what it is usually 
taken to mean, but seems to signify something else. As Burke noted, “what goes forth as A 
returns as non-A.”42 In this inversion, the thing that is unquestioned can become questionable, 
and the thing that is accepted as common can become strange.43 Speakers utilizing romantic 
irony often hold a detached, superior attitude; they seek hierarchical distinctions from others as a 
                                                           
36 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” 49.  
37 Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society, 255.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Elizabeth A. Wright, “Joking Isn’t Safe: Fanny Fern, Irony, and Signifyin(g),” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 31 
(2001): 93. 
40 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” 434. 
41 Elizabeth Galewski, “The Strange Case for Women’s Capacity to Reason: Judith Sargent Murray’s Use of Irony 
in ‘On the Equality of the Sexes’ (1790),” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 93 (2007): 87. 
42 Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives, 517.  
43 Elizabeth Galewski, 87. 
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means of positioning and tend to “look down” on others.44 Dialectic or “true” irony is quite 
different. It brings about the attribute of humility and does not make the claim of superiority. As 
Burke stated, dialectic irony “is based on a sense of fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one 
needs him/[her].”45 The second half of the dialectic becomes a necessary modifier.46 Speakers 
who choose to embrace dialectic irony favor an intimate, collegial attitude, and seek connections 
with others as a means of positioning themselves.47 For Eisenhower, unifying Europe under a 
fledgling NATO and promoting the rearmament of Western Germany, dialectic irony fostered 
“connections” between himself, NATO and his European audiences.  While romantic irony 
appeared occasionally in his SACEUR rhetoric, it is not prevalent throughout his speeches. 
When implementing irony, speakers are asking their audience to recognize 
incompatibilities in what the speaker is saying and what the speaker believes, causing the 
audience to question the validity of a statement. Irony requires an audience’s detailed 
understanding of the author/speaker.48 For irony to effectively allow the speaker to identify with 
his or her audience, the speaker must be dealing with a fairly high level of cultural homogeneity 
while recognizing the context of a culturally diverse world.49 A speaker relying on irony also 
needs an audience that is sophisticated enough to recognize the numerous voices at play in ironic 
statements.50 Often, the speaker adds in a “wink” to be sure the audience recognizes the irony.51  
Finally, irony is a tool used to help a speaker and a bifurcated, or split, audience identify 
with one another to find common ground. David Kaufner identified five cases in which a speaker 
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could use irony to rhetorically frame a situation for a bifurcated audience, including: (1) building 
in-group cohesion by victimizing out-groups; (2) victimizing one audience in order to achieve 
affiliation with another audience; (3) victimizing an audience while addressing it; (4) holding 
two incompatible audiences at bay; and (5) using irony to convey a false character.52  The type of 
irony implemented within Eisenhower’s speeches is best classified as the first option, irony in 
pursuit if group cohesion. The one thing Eisenhower shared with his audience from the start was 
the fear of Soviet and communist aggression. Therefore, he could easily make ironic statements 
about the Soviets, knowing his audience would understand his words were ironic and not literal.  
For Eisenhower, irony was the trope used the least in his speeches across Europe, but in 
particular, he used irony most in France. When he did implement irony, he chose well-known 
dialectics, such as communism versus freedom or east versus west. While limited in use, irony 
allowed Eisenhower to make damaging statements about his enemy, the Soviets, without 
sounding belligerent or compromising his well-known friendly demeanor, and it allowed 
Eisenhower to reinforce the bond between himself and his audience by choosing to implement 
dialectics well-known by his audience but that may not have been as accessible to members 
outside the NATO countries or the US. Irony helped Eisenhower create a close-knit group of 
NATO countries through his rhetoric. His use of metonym, while also limited, was meant to help 
create cohesion among NATO nations as well. 
Metonymy 
 Burke described the basic “strategy” in metonymy as being able to “convey some 
incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible.”53 An example is someone 
claiming they are speaking from “the heart” rather than with “emotions.” Other examples include 
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a crown used to represent a King, or a pen may be used to represent a writer.54 Peter Cramer 
highlighted the usage of the metonym grammatically with the term “public,” which can be seen 
as a representation of the shift from an intangible idea, “a public space,” to the tangible idea of “a 
public body of people.”55 For Burke, metonymy was both poetic and scientific, because 
metonymy allows poets and scientists to take something like the emotion of “shame” and 
translate it into the “movement of the eye, a color of the cheek, [or] a certain quality of voice and 
set of muscles.56 There is a slight difference between Burke’s poetic and scientific metonyms. 
Burke reasoned that poetic metonymy provides a “terminological reduction whereas the 
scientific behaviorists offers his reduction as a ‘real’ reduction.”57 The difference between the 
two is not their ability to reduce the content, but their overall knowledge.58 
As a specific example, Burke said metonyms are often found in our terminology for 
“spiritual” states. In his 2009 essay, Christian Lundberg discussed how metonymy, among other 
master tropes, functioned within the evangelical public interested in Mel Gibson’s The Passion 
of the Christ film. In particular, Lundberg noted how the scene of Jesus’s scourge allowed two 
key metonyms to emerge: (1) Jesus became a metonym for the “evangelical public of the film”: 
and (2) the Romans, or persecutors of Jesus, became a metonym for the perceived “persecutors 
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of the modern evangelical community.”59 Again, we see the connection between intangible 
ideals, victimization and persecution, to more tangible concepts, Jesus and the Roman guard. For 
Eisenhower, metonyms allowed him to reduce communism, fear and other intangible ideas 
prevalent in the early 1950s into tangible, “real” things that helped support his urgent need for 
the unification of Europe, or support of a unified European military, under NATO’s supervision. 
Synecdoche 
 Burke once referred to synecdoche as “Trope No. 1.”60 Synecdoche implies “as integral 
relationship, a relationship of convertibility, between [two terms].”61 The two terms represent a 
conversion from part for whole, whole for part, cause for effect, and effect for cause. The “part 
for whole” is the most common synecdoche. Examples are “all hands on deck” or the use of the 
term “daily bread” when referring to food.62 Synecdoche is an interesting trope, uniting two 
things that are different from each other or representing intangible ideas or emotions (such as 
freedom or fear). Yet, it can also make an issue more complex by shifting the real focus of a 
debate. For example, an environmental debate focused on wetland preservation can shift focus to 
the protection of a single species, distracting the audience from the original concern and making 
the problem seem less “important” because the focus is only on one species rather than the entire 
ecosystem.63 The main different between synecdoche and Burke’s other master trope, metonymy 
(or reduction), is that synecdoche emphasizes a “connectedness” between two sides of “a road” 
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that extends in either direction, while metonymy follows along “the road” in only one direction.64 
In other words, metonymy helps speakers lead their audience to a single, specific conclusion 
while synecdoche allows speakers to show audiences how various concepts are connected. 
In communication literature, one of the most well-known rhetorical scholars of 
synecdoche, with a particular emphasis on social movement controversies, is Mark Moore. Over 
the years, Moore has discussed the social and political impact of synecdoche’s role as it relates to 
the spotted owl environmental controversy (the owl representing the endangered environment), 
the handgun debate (the handgun representing both a threat to life and a protector of liberty) and 
most recently, how the salmon functions synecdochically as an icon in the Pacific Northwest.65 
In all of Moore’s case studies, synecdoche functioned to frame the terms of the conflict and 
determine the different types of solutions available for each conflict.66  
Within his SACEUR rhetoric, Eisenhower used synecdoche to show an informative and 
representative connection between linked concepts.67 His use of synecdoche allowed him to cast 
different audiences in Europe (such as the French or British) as representative of the values of all 
of Europe, a part for a whole. Framing the conflict and eventual solutions was important for 
Eisenhower’s rhetoric. As Supreme Commander, Eisenhower needed to strategically plan his 
rhetoric so that the creation of the EDC and eventual rearmament of Germany were the only 
viable solutions to a more secure Europe, helping NATO establish a stronghold in Europe and 
build its foundation for becoming the international organization it is today. Synecdoche, coupled 
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with his use of metaphor, metonymy and irony, allowed Eisenhower to identify with his 
European audience and craft a persuasive call for the unification of Europe under NATO. 
1.2 Analyzing Burkean Tropes in Public Address 
I have used Burke’s theory of the four master tropes to examine Eisenhower’s unique role 
in the development of a unified European community, through his argument favoring the 
unification of European defense forces against a common enemy. By persuading European 
countries to favor unification during his tenure as SACEUR, Eisenhower was able to create a 
foundation for the development of NATO as a strong, multinational organization. Using key 
speeches,68 I review how Eisenhower’s use of tropes shed light on his persuasive strategies.69 
For my analysis, I applied Burke’s framework to identify when and how Eisenhower 
employs each trope, in selected speeches, letters and diary entries. I begin by analyzing 
transcripts of key speeches.70 Eisenhower’s audiences for these speeches, and the context 
surrounding them, made the selected speeches ideal for this analysis. In terms of audience, the 
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British and French were important audiences for Eisenhower, of particular importance to his 
overall efforts in attempting to establish the EDC and enable the rearmament of Western 
Germany. The French led the effort against the rearmament of Germany because of past 
conflicts, and the British were against the idea of being bound to the rest of Europe by the 
proposed European defense community. This made the political leadership of both countries key 
audiences when looking at persuasion tactics in Eisenhower’s SACEUR rhetoric. Not only are 
only were the audiences a key reason for the choice of these particular speeches, but they also 
span the entirety of Eisenhower’s term as SACEUR, allowing me to trace his use of tropes 
holistically and over time. 
In addition to a detailed review of these speech transcripts, I review Eisenhower’s various 
personal diary entries and letters to various officials surrounding the dates of these particular 
speeches and the general topics of German rearmament the creation of unified European military 
force and the founding of NATO to establish contextual support for my speech analysis.71 Third, 
I will identify when and where Eisenhower employs each master trope and explain how they 
reveal (1) how he sought to identify with his audiences to overcome his lack of legitimacy in 
front of a European audience and (2) how he asked the audience to identify with his message 
concerning the need to rearm West Germany, form the European defense community and 
ultimately, trust in NATO.   
In addition, I will explain why Eisenhower used specific tropes to bring his message of 
unity to the forefront of his rhetoric. Metaphors are most powerful when they are accepted as 
literal by the audience; the longer the metaphor could be maintained over time, the greater the 
influence of the speaker. Eisenhower sustained select metaphors throughout his tenure as 
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SACEUR, theoretically making them more influential and more persuasive over time for his 
audiences. Synecdoche and metonymy allowed Eisenhower to frame the conflict over the 
creation of a unified European defense community and rearmament of Germany as potential 
solutions. Finally, irony gave Eisenhower a tool to establish camaraderie between himself and 
his audiences. All were vital, because as Supreme Commander, Eisenhower needed to 
strategically plan his rhetoric so that the creation of a unified European military was the only 
viable solution to a more secure Europe during the early 1950s. 
1.3 Chapter Outline 
The remainder of this thesis will proceed in three chapters concentrated on relevant 
historical events that occurred prior to Eisenhower’s tenure as SACEUR, Eisenhower’s use of 
specific tropes designed to help him persuade and identify with audiences, and a discussion of 
the importance of this often overlooked time in Eisenhower’s rhetorical career and the history of 
the development of the European Union and NATO.  
The second chapter is a discussion of the context leading up to and surrounding 
Eisenhower’s various addresses as SACEUR, including information gathered from his personal 
diary entries, letters written to various US and foreign intelligence personnel, historical accounts 
and rhetorical analyses. The chapter will be broken down into the following sections: (1) An 
overview of Eisenhower’s debated appointment to lead TORCH and the North African campaign 
and the complicated political dealings of TORCH, the North African campaign and 
OVERLORD; (2) A discussion of the treaties and international agreements leading up to NATO 
and during Eisenhower’s time as SACEUR that enabled the idea of the European defense 
community to become a policy option for Eisenhower’s forces in Europe; and (3) A review the 
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1947-1950 build-up of Soviet Union and US and Europe conflict leading into Eisenhower’s 
appointment as SACEUR, as well as explain events surrounding Eisenhower’s appointment.  
This detailed contextual set-up is vital, because, as Martin J. Medhurst noted, “To 
analyze Cold War rhetoric the critic must first become a strategist, seeking to understand the 
goals being pursued, the historical, political, economic, diplomatic and military constraints that 
exist, and the precise situational configuration.”72 The critic must understand the context of the 
rhetoric, including the goals, constraints and forces interacting to form said context, in order to 
have a solid position from which to analyze, interpret and judge particular pieces of discourse. 
To better judge Eisenhower’s SACEUR rhetoric, create an adequate understanding of the 
surrounding contexts, and review how those contexts worked to influence what he could and 
could not say to his audience is critical. 
The third chapter will provide a rhetorical analysis of Eisenhower’s SACEUR speeches 
to French, British and NATO-specific audiences, such as the NATO Council and SHAPE staff, 
relying on Kenneth’s Burke’s theory of persuasion through the use of the four master tropes: 
metaphor, irony, metonymy and synecdoche. This analysis will bring to the forefront two things. 
First, it will show the way in which Eisenhower sought to identify with his audiences, and 
second, the ways in which Eisenhower asks the audience to identify with his message concerning 
the need to create a strong, structured and unified European defense force. The analysis will be 
broken into four sections, each correlating to one of Burke’s four tropes. These sections of the 
analysis will shed light on Eisenhower’s overall use of tropes and how they each enabled him to 
position NATO as a strong international alliance and springboard for a unified European 
military, and eventually, unified European community  
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The fourth and final chapter of this thesis will summarize the earlier chapters and identify 
themes of argument between each of them. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of how 
rhetorical and historical scholars have glossed over an important time in Eisenhower’s life and 
rhetoric, his time as SACEUR in the early 1950s, and how this better understanding of 
Eisenhower’s persuasive tactics could add further insight into future scholarship on Eisenhower, 
the founding years of NATO and the early attempts to unify Europe, leading to the eventual 
creation of the European Union. The final chapter will also contain a discussion of potential 
related studies on other overlooked pieces of Eisenhower’s rhetoric after his service in WWII 
and prior to his presidency in 1952.  
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2. CONTEXT 
In 1942, America’s challenge was to build an army and establish an organization to craft 
an agreement between Britain and France on a strategy to defeat Hitler’s Germany win the war in 
the Pacific.73 Eisenhower’s greatest effort in Allied cooperation occurred between 1942 and 
1945, from the beginning of operation TORCH, meant to drive the Axis powers74 from their 
stronghold in North Africa, to the close of operation OVERLORD, the final push against the 
Germans on the beaches of Normandy, France, known as D-Day.75  
Eisenhower’s journey from TORCH to OVERLORD was not easy. This chapter proceeds 
in two parts. First, I review Eisenhower’s role in coalition building and conflict negotiation 
during the closing years of WWII.  I discuss (1) Eisenhower’s controversial appointment to lead 
TORCH and the North African campaign, his complicated political dealings with the Vichy 
French, and his poor negotiation of the campaign; (2) The various treaties and international 
agreements leading up to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and during Eisenhower’s time 
as SACEUR that enabled the idea of the European Defense Community (EDC) to become a 
policy option for Eisenhower’s forces in Europe; and (3) The 1947-1950 build-up of the east 
(Soviet Union) and west (US and Europe) conflict leading into Eisenhower’s appointment as 
SACEUR as well as the discussion surrounding Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR.  
By the end of this chapter, the striking similarities between Eisenhower’s role near the 
end of WWII and Eisenhower’s role at the beginning of NATO will be evident. Eisenhower’s 
service in WWII, particularly his role in the preparation and execution of operations TORCH and 
OVERLORD, introduced him to the complexities of managing the military aspect of 
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international cooperation, including the difficulties of Allied cooperation. He also began his 
diplomatic education, forcing him to engage in political decision making and “subtle niceties” 
despite his desire to remain apolitical and focused strictly on military strategy.76 Eisenhower 
would use these lessons, especially in relation to his dealings with Vichy French leadership, 
when called to lead NATO forces in Europe. In both cases, in order to accomplish his 
instrumental goal—the creations of a unified European coalition, Eisenhower had to accomplish 
his constitutive goal, the development of a shared sense of identity between the various countries 
of Europe.  
2.1 WWII: Eisenhower and the North African Campaign   
Shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower received word that he was to leave 
his post as Chief of Staff of the US Third Army in San Antonio, Texas, and report to Army Chief 
of Staff George C. Marshall in Washington, D.C. In 1942, America needed to build their army, 
secure the shipping route to get that army to Europe, establish an organization that would allow 
America and Britain to agree on a plan to defeat Germany and resist the pull to put the Pacific 
conflict first.77 The army’s responsibility to help secure these objectives was ultimately left to 
Marshall, and in turn, to Eisenhower. According to Stephen Ambrose, a preeminent Eisenhower 
scholar, Marshall chose Eisenhower partially due to his past service on the staff of notable US 
military leaders—including General Douglas MacArthur—and partly because he was known in 
the army as a man that would “assume responsibility.”78 Indeed, during his time under Marshall, 
Eisenhower was described as “the perfect man to take Marshall’s concepts and translate them 
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into practice.”79 Eisenhower brought the know-how to create action in support of Marshall’s 
strengths, including policy, organization and strategy. 
 His achievements to date had been as a staff officer. And while his superiors believed he 
would be a success as an independent commander, Eisenhower had only served under strong-
willed superiors; he needed a way to prove his leadership ability, and operation TORCH would 
serve that purpose. There was some debate on who should lead TORCH. The Combined Chiefs 
of Staff (CCS), the supreme military command for the Western Allies during WWII, wanted 
Marshall. Regardless of what the CCS wanted, Marshall would never have left his position for a 
field command position and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would not have let him.80 
The solution the CCS and the British finally agreed upon was Eisenhower; he was available, he 
served directly under Marshall and, under their original plan, he would only be in charge of 
planning TORCH until someone else higher in rank became available to assume command over 
the operation.81 It seemed a win-win solution for all parties involved. 
On June 11, 1942, Marshall told Eisenhower he was “the guy” that would become the 
Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations against Germany.82 On August 2, 
Eisenhower took “executive authority” over TORCH planning as Commander-in-Chief.83 His 
first task was to build a headquarters to run his operations. He needed to ensure the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), an essential component of the British-
American effort, was strong and operational.84 Even though SHAEF was essentially a British-
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American effort, there were differences between the training of these Allied troops. The British 
were long-time experts in dealing with “peoples and organizations of varying interests,” and this 
meant the British seemed to be “better qualified” to serve on an international military staff than 
their American counterparts.85 The Americans were less accustomed to working outside the US.  
This caused some tension between the Americans and the British. To create cooperation among 
the ranks, Eisenhower recruited as equally as possible from American and British forces. As 
Ambrose noted, “The system worked, mainly because of the determination of the participants to 
make it work, partly because of Eisenhower’s leadership.”86 Solidarity was a vital and necessary 
characteristic for Eisenhower’s troops, so he maintained this “opposite number” system, two 
officers, one American and one British, paired together in every position in the organization.87 
Americans who refused to cooperate with their British counterparts were sent back to the US.88 
By sifting out soldiers who refused to respect one another, Eisenhower began building a coalition 
headquarters comprised of an international staff that worked together as an allied team. With the 
headquarters up and running, Eisenhower began detailed planning for operation TORCH.   
To successfully drive the Axis powers out of North Africa, the Allied forces would have 
to push them out through French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. This involved long distances 
and the need for a cooperative relationship between the Allies and the neutral Vichy French, who 
held control of half of the North African coast.89 Moreover, while fighting back the Axis, 
Eisenhower’s troops would have to be on guard against the imminent flood of German troops 
into Tunis, the capital of Tunisia in the Gulf of Tunis in the Mediterranean Sea, once the Allied 
attack began. Eisenhower needed Vichy troops to form a resistance against the Germans, 
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blocking their movement into North Africa while the Allied forces fought the Axis. Eisenhower 
needed to find a Vichy leader he could trust to carry out the task. Yet the task of finding someone 
in the Vichy hierarchy to assume leadership in North Africa would not be without its own set of 
challenges, not least among them the difficult relationship between the Vichy and Free French. 
And while Eisenhower would make mistakes during his negotiations, his dealings with Vichy 
leadership would help prepare him for his later dealings with the French in 1951.  
TORCH: Politics, Policy and Negotiations 
There were important political and strategic issues at stake in the selection of a Vichy 
leader for the North African campaign. The Vichy Government was formed after the 1940 
German defeat of the French. By the end of the German invasion, France was divided into three 
German occupation zones governed by a rump state, Vichy France. The Vichy maintained the 
most control in the southern “free zone” under the leadership of Marshal Philippe Pétain, yet 
Pétain’s leadership was challenged by exiled General, and leader of the Free French movement, 
Charles de Gaulle, a man who claimed to represent the legitimacy and continuity of the French 
government.90 In order to make operation TORCH a success, Eisenhower needed to decide who 
he could trust most to place the Allies’ interests above those of the Axis. To make matters worse, 
the British and the Americans did not agree on where to begin their search. 
Prior to TORCH, the US had maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government, 
including Pétain and his followers such as Admiral Jean Darlan and French General Henri 
Giraud. In American eyes, the US could “do business” with the Vichy while de Gaulle was 
combative.91 He continuously denounced the US for its pro-Vichy policies. In opposition, the 
British had given their support to de Gaulle. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Britain, 
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had decided that de Gaulle’s Free French Movement was a far greater alliance than the Vichy, 
because de Gaulle and followers had not “accepted surrender and dishonor” during the 1940 
invasion of France.92 While the British fought side-by-side with the French during WWII, 
Churchill felt that the Vichy French enabled the German strike against Britain during the Battle 
of Britain and disliked the idea of having to work with them during TORCH.93 With the British 
supporting de Gaulle and the US supporting Giraud, Darlan or anyone besides de Gaulle, there 
was a clear split in Allied operations Eisenhower needed to address. Eisenhower “knew 
practically nothing of the political complexities” and was only interested in the military problem: 
finding a Frenchman who would help his troops move through North Africa and secure Tunis.94     
Based on recommendations from the US State Department, Eisenhower began 
discussions with Giraud.95 Eisenhower acknowledged that the selection of a French leader would 
be a rather “delicate” matter, but he assured his superiors that he could handle it. Yet his lack of 
experience in political negotiation became apparent rather quickly. For Eisenhower, Giraud’s 
military rank and lack of opposition to Allied entrance into North Africa made him the first 
choice for the job.96 Immediately there was a roadblock. Giraud wanted nothing less than to be 
named Commander-in-Chief not only of the French forces, but of the entire Allied operation 
after the landing in Algeria.97 From Giraud’s point of view, the Allies were invading his country, 
asking him to be the face of their aggression but withholding any real authority from him. 
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Eisenhower tried to compromise. He promised Giraud could be Governor—essentially the 
president—of North Africa with enough money to build his own army, navy and air force. He 
would not give him command of the military forces. Giraud refused. He would accept nothing 
less than supreme command. After further negotiation, Eisenhower eventually agreed to allow 
Giraud to be Commander-in-Chief of the French ground forces and governor of the area after the 
fight concluded. Even though he had made a deal with Giraud, Eisenhower soon realized Giraud 
had no real authority or place in the French hierarchy.98 Darlan did. Eisenhower now needed to 
convince Darlan to agree to become actively involved in TORCH.  
Darlan was the Commander-in-Chief of French armed forces, and the Vichy could only 
fight under Eisenhower if Darlan issued the order.99 Eisenhower made Darlan Chief 
Administrative Officer in North Africa and placed Giraud under his command. Eisenhower’s 
only concern was saving the French fleet in Tunis. He naively disregarded the US and British 
reaction to a deal with Darlan; he expected minor complaints but assumed that as long as Darlan 
came through in the end, everyone would agree he made the right decision.100 The British were 
furious. They had agreed to ignore de Gaulle only if Giraud was the next choice. Giraud had no 
Vichy connections while Darlan represented everything Churchill opposed.101 Churchill strongly 
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believed he could get de Gaulle to work with Giraud, but he knew de Gaulle would never work 
with Darlan. Darlan had denounced the Free French Movement even more vociferously than 
Pétain.102 After numerous letters and discussions between Churchill and Roosevelt, Roosevelt 
finally got Churchill to agree to ratify Eisenhower’s agreement with Darlan. Roosevelt knew 
Eisenhower would take most of the blame if anything went awry. Now that Roosevelt had 
approved what became known as the Darlan Deal, Eisenhower thought he could turn his focus 
away from the political and back to the military forces on the ground.    
He was wrong. Darlan soon began to start backtracking on his deal with Eisenhower. 
According to the deal, Darlan was not to take any position as a genuine head of government until 
after the conflict had ended and the Allies had successfully removed the Axis threat from North 
Africa; Darlan had other motives. When Pétain was taken prisoner by German forces, Darlan 
planned to announce he was taking over as Head of State, but Eisenhower immediately put a stop 
to Darlan’s announcement. He noted that Darlan’s authority was only local and he was not in 
charge of the Vichy state.103 Criticism of the Darlan Deal continued until December 24, 1942, 
when Eisenhower received word that Darlan had been assassinated. Overall, Darlan’s death was 
a positive for Eisenhower and the US—it removed the lingering tension between the British and 
US, opening the door to a unified policy with regard to the French, and it helped Eisenhower put 
an end to his political embarrassment.104 With Darlan gone, Eisenhower could finally turn his 
attention to military matters and the battle of Tunisia.  
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The Allies eventually won back control of Kasserine Pass, forcing the Axis from Tunisia 
and allowing Eisenhower to increase forces and equipment daily.105 With the Axis powers driven 
from North Africa, the Allies continued to force the German ground troops to retreat, paving the 
way for operation HUSKY, or the invasion of Sicily and Italy.106 TORCH was just the foothold 
needed to make HUSKY, a large scale airborne operation followed by six weeks of land combat, 
possible. HUSKY ended in August 1943, with the Allies taking control of Sicily, and eventually 
Italy, from the Axis powers.107 HUSKY would eventually lead into the battle that would end the 
European part of WWII in Normandy: Operation OVERLORD. Going into TORCH, Eisenhower 
had never commanded his own forces. During TORCH, he had a rude awakening as he learned 
how to juggle political and military disagreements with regards to the Vichy French and the 
Allied relationship between Britain and the US. After TORCH and HUSKY, Eisenhower had 
finally earned the trust of his superiors, and if he could keep that trust, he would also be seen as a 
success as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces for operation OVERLORD. 
OVERLORD: Politics, Policy and Negotiations 
In late 1943, operation OVERLORD was the next step in overtaking the Axis and 
defeating them in Western Europe. The main goal of the operation was to get on shore in France 
and move from there to Berlin. At the time, it was to be the “largest military undertaking in 
man’s history,” and finding the right military commander for the operation was essential. Similar 
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to TORCH, Eisenhower was not the first and only choice for command.108 Usually, the CCS was 
responsible for the selection of the commander, but since members of the CCS were potential 
candidates for the honor, they deferred to the heads of state, Churchill and Roosevelt, and 
Churchill deferred to Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s first choice was Marshall, the one who had thought 
up OVERLORD initially and pressed for its importance in the overall WWII allied strategy.109 
After some negative initial reactions to his choice, Roosevelt decided to keep his options open.110 
Eisenhower began to stand out as the next logical choice. He presented to the CCS on the current 
plans for OVERLORD and impressed them with his “firm grasp of the military situation” and his 
“realistic” position about the possibilities of the operation.111 Moreover, if Marshall was not 
going to command the operation, there still needed to be an American in charge. With the USSR 
and Britain pushing for a commander to be named immediately, Roosevelt finally decided that 
Eisenhower would command OVERLORD. On a side trip to Tunisia, Roosevelt met Eisenhower 
on a plane and simply said, “Well, Ike, you are going to command OVERLORD”112 As 
Eisenhower took over preparations for the final siege of  the war, Charles de Gaulle—who 
played a role during Eisenhower’s negotiation of the Darlan Deal—became a central issue again. 
In December 1943, de Gaulle decided to take decisive action against the Vichy French 
administration that opposed him. He placed central Vichy leaders under arrest with the threat to 
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kill them. Since OVERLORD was to take place on the beaches of Normandy, France, and 
Eisenhower needed the support of the French Resistance and de Gaulle, Eisenhower was 
immediately concerned about Roosevelt and Churchill’s reactions to de Gaulle’s actions; 
Eisenhower was correct to have concerns. Churchill wanted to offer the arrested Frenchman 
asylum to send a warning to de Gaulle, and Roosevelt went so far as to order de Gaulle to “take 
no action” against the individuals who had helped fight with the Allied armies during 
TORCH.113 Because Eisenhower and de Gaulle had formed a working relationship during 
TORCH, de Gaulle trusted Eisenhower and wanted to negotiate with him. When de Gaulle asked 
that his French troops be the first into the French capital during OVERLORD, Eisenhower, along 
with Roosevelt, agreed. Roosevelt only compromised because if the French did not participate in 
OVERLORD, de Gaulle would be unhappy. If de Gaulle was unhappy, he would not have the 
Resistance move allied troops from the Mediterranean through the south of France in preparation 
for OVERLORD. Finally, once pleased with the deal, de Gaulle ensured he would not harm the 
Vichy administrators.114 Eisenhower was learning how to deal with French political leadership. 
Yet soon after earning de Gaulle’s agreement to support the Allied invasion, Roosevelt 
and Churchill created another rift in their dealings with de Gaulle, and they placed Eisenhower in 
the middle of that rift. Once the conflict ended with Allied victory and France was liberated, 
Roosevelt wanted the American Army to hold France in trust until free elections could take place 
for new French leadership.115 Churchill’s only concern was a strong and vigorous France after 
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the war, because Britain needed a strong ally to hold back the communist threat once the German 
army was defeated.116 While Roosevelt agreed a strong France was ideal in the fight against the 
communists, his personal dislike of de Gaulle made him push against placing de Gaulle in a 
position of power without election after OVERLORD. Eisenhower needed to reconcile these 
conflicting Allied policies while keeping the military focus on the defeat of Germany. 
Eisenhower decided to convince Roosevelt and the US State Department that a Gaullist France 
was the better option during and after OVERLORD for numerous reasons.117   
In January 1944, Eisenhower began his campaign to form a working relationship between 
Washington and de Gaulle.118 Eisenhower stood by his belief that de Gaulle and the French 
Resistance were vital to the success of the French campaign, but Roosevelt held fast to his 
position that forcing the French to follow de Gaulle could cause a Civil War. Personal 
disagreements aside, Roosevelt claimed to be perfectly willing to make de Gaulle the new 
French figurehead as long as it was not against the will of the French people; if the majority of 
the French wanted de Gaulle’s leadership, Roosevelt would not get in the way.119 Conferences 
went on for two months in London until Churchill decided to invite de Gaulle into the 
discussion. Churchill and Roosevelt proceeded to brief de Gaulle on OVERLORD and asked for 
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his cooperation in getting the French and the Resistance to follow Eisenhower’s command. De 
Gaulle refused, saying politics and the military were tied together; he would not lend his support 
until he was recognized as a political leader.120 He would not get in the way of the Allied 
operation, but de Gaulle refused to help them until he was given something in return. 
 On the eve of OVERLORD, June 5, 1944, de Gaulle still refused to support the 
operation even after the American and British announcements of support. Eisenhower finally 
became fed up with the entire situation and told his staff to tell de Gaulle, “To hell with him and 
if he doesn’t come through, we’ll deal with someone else.”121 This may have been just the push 
needed to get de Gaulle to cooperate to some extent. On the morning of the invasion, de Gaulle, 
made a statement of support for OVERLORD and noted that Eisenhower was a recognized 
leader whose orders should be acknowledged by the French.122  
OVERLORD began on June 6 and ended in September 1944.123 Yet near the end of 
OVERLORD, de Gaulle once again became an obstacle. When Eisenhower had agreed to have 
de Gaulle help with OVERLORD, it was implied de Gaulle would help liberate Paris. A 
liberated Paris translated to a liberated France. In August, when the Allied forces reached Paris, 
de Gaulle and other members of the Resistance began pressuring Eisenhower to allow them into 
the capital. Eisenhower struggled with this decision, because so far, he had managed to keep 
military and political decisions separate. If he allowed de Gaulle to move forward with his 
troops, allowing the French to use their military for political gain independent of the Allied 
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command, there would not be much in the way to stop other countries from doing the same.124 In 
the end, Eisenhower decided it was in the best interests of the military operation to move forward 
and take control of Paris from the Germans. The political aspect returned once de Gaulle had 
secured Paris and asked for formal recognition from Britain and the United States on the 
legitimacy of his leadership. After a long struggle, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain 
and five other nations recognized the French provisional government lead by de Gaulle. The 
political problem seemed solved, but the end of the war brought one last dispute with the French. 
After the Allied victory, the Allies would not allow the French representation in the 
Allied Control Council (ACC) even though the French had committed a large number of troops 
to the effort against the Germans in OVERLORD and subsequent battles. As an act of protest, de 
Gaulle gave orders for the French forces to ignore orders from Eisenhower, Allied commander. 
De Gaulle assured Eisenhower his lack of support was only due to the recent disagreement with 
the Allied governments. This was the most direct challenge to Eisenhower’s authority to date.125 
Eventually, de Gaulle got what he wanted: A seat on the ACC.126 By the end of OVERLORD 
and his multiple dealings with de Gaulle and the French Resistance, Eisenhower realized that the 
political and the military efforts were not as separate as he had tried to keep them when it came 
to the French.  
WWII: Lessons Learned 
On May 7, 1945, WWII came to an end in Europe with victory for the Allies.127 
Eisenhower’s command in operations TORCH and OVERLORD introduced him to the 
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complexities of managing the military aspect of international cooperation, including the 
difficulties of Allied cooperation seen during the establishment of SHAEF and the garnering of 
Allied forces. In addition, the planning and implementation of OVERLORD were essential to the 
execution of Eisenhower’s main objective, the destruction of the German forces. The 
OVERLORD campaign was divided into six phases, each consisting of a number of sequential 
and simultaneous operations, including the various discussions with the French and Vichy 
leadership.128 While not discussed earlier, because the remainder of this thesis does not delve too 
far into Eisenhower’s military planning or tactics during his time as SACEUR, Eisenhower’s 
ability to strategically create a plan and execute it in order to achieve his ultimate goal can be 
seen as a similar task to what he would do with Western Europe during his time as SACEUR. 
Moreover, his negotiations with French leadership, including Darlan, Giraud, Pétain and 
de Gaulle, gave him insight into how to best deal with the French while SACEUR. First, the 
French did not want to be given false promises. Eisenhower was very clear, precise and did not 
like to waste time with lengthy negotiations. As Ambrose said, “Darlan and de Gaulle felt they 
could trust Eisenhower because they knew where he stood and that he said exactly what he 
meant.”129 His honesty made him trustworthy during negotiations; his word was taken as 
reliable. Second, the French were stubborn and sometimes hasty with their demands. 
Eisenhower’s natural personality, his “lack of ruthlessness” served him well when dealing with 
this aspect of the French politicians. He was never quick to instigate conflict. Eisenhower always 
worked to “adjust personalities to one another” to smooth over differences between opposing 
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parties. When it came to the numerous disagreements between de Gaulle and Eisenhower and 
Churchill during OVERLORD planning, this was a key trait. Finally, Eisenhower learned he 
would need patience. Any dealing with French political leadership would not happen overnight; 
it would take time, a great deal of effort and would entail a variety of  setbacks.   
Yet in the years between the end of WWII and Eisenhower’s emergence as SACEUR, the 
French found themselves in the middle of numerous events that would deepen the tension 
between the Soviets in the east and the US and Europe to the west. This Cold War would make 
Eisenhower’s call for the creations of a unified European coalition a tough case to make under 
the fledgling NATO.  
2.2 1948-1950: Efforts Toward Cooperation in Europe 
By 1948, the ideological split between Soviet communists and Western Europe and the 
US was already clear. The Soviet Union had begun anti-Western propaganda, claiming that the 
world was split between the socialist and capitalist camps, noting the former would triumph in 
the end.130 The US and the UK had adopted a policy of containment, working to ensure the 
Soviet Union could not spread its sphere of influence into Western Europe and beyond.131 The 
“state of world tension” made it very “advisable for every nation to overhaul its military 
machine.”132 As various declassified memos and reports from the Central Intelligence Agency 
suggest, the US made the assumption that the Soviets were preparing for war while, the Soviets 
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assume the US and Western Europe were making their own preparations against a possible 
clandestine attack.133  
In order for the US and Europe to best defend themselves from the threat of Soviet and 
communist expansion, the countries needed to establish an organized, cooperative Western 
Europe. The Marshall Plan, the British-French-Benelux Treaty (commonly called the Treaty 
of Brussels), the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were all efforts that served as the base for 
the concept of the European Defense Community (EDC) which Eisenhower would later promote 
as SACEUR. These plans were all discussed before or during 1950, the year Eisenhower took his 
position as SACEUR. Their roles in various attempts at unifying European countries must be 
explored to best understand Eisenhower’s push for the EDC through his SACEUR rhetoric.  
The Marshall Plan and the Treaty of Brussels 
In September 1946, Churchill gave his famous Zurich speech, calling for the creation 
of a “kind of United States of Europe,” and at that time, Europe was still recovering from 
WWII and was in a dire economic state requiring international aid from the US and other 
nations.134  Following Marshall’s speech outlining a post-war European aid program during 
a Harvard University commencement ceremony in June 1947, the Committee on European 
Economic Cooperation (CEEC) met in Paris to draft a recovery plan for Europe.135 The main 
goals included economic aid and planning principles that would guide European and 
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American action in the years to come. These principles included self-help and mutual aid, 
resource sharing and, eventually, German reconstruction.136 The Marshall Plan countries 
needed a “new pattern of intra-European trade and exchange,” new efforts to adjust national 
economies to the needs of Europe as a whole, and revised uses of Europe’s resources.137 
According to the American strategy, West Germany needed to be included in the common 
structure of a “free Europe” if the West was to avoid a threatening Soviet-German 
partnership or German economic leadership in the already-weakened continent. Western 
Europe wanted Germany’s economic resources, even if their mistrust of German intentions 
meant that they couldn’t agree to involve Germany in NATO until the mid-1950s.138   
The French were determined to incorporate their Monnet Plan for industrial re-
equipment and modernization in any plan for general European recovery, and the British 
were wary of agreeing to any plan that could threaten their trade and payment options with 
Western Europe.139 The Benelux governments offered a third option to help participating 
European countries balance their budgets, establish realistic exchange rates and make 
currencies transferable between nations. The British and French still held up the process, 
and the Americans felt they were not being “realistic” in their decisions at the CEEC 
because they refused to eliminate waste and take the considerations of Europe as a whole 
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into account.140  By September, it was clear that the US was not going to make any progress 
in crafting a European union at this time. Instead of the CEEC becoming a sort of supra-
national organization that would govern Europe’s recovery efforts as a whole, the CEEC 
finished its work as a committee with the simple goal of monitoring the progress of various 
countries’ recovery programs, issuing reports and encouraging the countries to engage in 
self-help and mutual aid to meet the objectives of their recovery programs.141  
And while the British-French-Benelux Treaty, also called the Brussels Pact, was 
signed on March 17, 1948, at Brussels, Belgium, there were still valid concerns in place 
concerning the unification of Europe.142 The disagreements between the US and European 
nations, mostly Britain and France, were simple: For the Europeans, the imperatives were 
national interest and sovereignty, and for the Americans, they were transnational action and 
cooperation. These differences would continue to stand as a challenge to US policy makers 
and to European economic recovery, adding tension to the European-American relationship 
during the next few years. And when Eisenhower began his own push in support of the 
EDC, a call for a united European military not all that different from the Marshall Plan’s 
call for a united European economic recovery plan, he would come up against the same 
challenges.143 Britain and France would still push for national interest and sovereignty while 
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Eisenhower called for transnational action and cooperation among the European nations. In 
time, the French would come to develop their own attempt to help in the overall defense and 
unity of Western Europe.  
The Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan 
Charles Cogan wrote that during the late 1940s and early 1950s “the great preoccupation 
of the Russians [was] in the area of security” and “the great obsession of the French… [was] that 
national independence, lost in 1940, must never be lost again.”144 Of all the great nations of 
Europe at the time of WWII, France was the only one conquered by Germany.145 As a victim of 
Nazi Germany, France was in the best position in the Western Alliance to argue against the 
recovery and rearmament of its former enemy.146 As seen with the Marshall Plan, France fought 
to maintain its recently-returned sovereignty. France lead the charge against German 
rearmament, not only because they feared the German revival, having experienced three 
German invasions in living memory (1870, 1914, 1940),147 but they genuinely “believed that 
German independence could only be controlled in a wider, European framework.”148 The 
French did not trust Germany to maintain armed forces without fear of an attack on the 
French, and therefore, wanted to maintain tight control over the rearmament process.   
By 1950, the Schuman Plan was France’s attempt to remain sovereign while trying to 
foster unity in Europe with the help of Germany. It was as much a response to the arguments 
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of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman as it was to international pressures for France 
to accept the need for European unity; Eisenhower was part of that international pressure. 
As we will see in the analysis in the following chapter, Schuman and Jean Monnet, the 
principal authors of the plan, may be considered the “fathers of a united Europe,” 
Eisenhower was an important component—currently ignored by historians and rhetoricians 
during his time as SACEUR—in helping persuade the French to pursue a relationship with 
their former enemy, Germany. The Schuman Plan, leading to the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the ECSC laid the foundation of the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957, a document leading to the founding of the European Economic 
Community and eventual creation of the European Union.149   
During June 1950, during the first year of Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR, 
talks concerning the creation of the ECSC began. From the beginning, the original six 
participating governments knew that the Schuman Plan was only the “first step” on the road 
to European unity. The ECSC was meant to take the place of the Council of Europe, which 
had proved incapable of bringing the governments of Europe together.150 France and 
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Germany, for different reasons, were the most invested in the success of the plan.151 The 
ECSC was meant to remove the control of the coal and steel production from the Ruhr 
(German) and Lorraine (French) Valleys and give operating authority to a supranational 
group.152 This would ultimately reduce, if not eliminate the German-French hostility that 
had plagued Europe through the middle of the 1900s.153 By August, delegates were reporting 
to their national governments that discussions would soon be concluded. The French and the 
Germans seemed certain a successful conclusion was nearly a reality. The Schuman plan 
negotiations fell into two phases. The first phase included rapid political progress on the 
institutions of the projected community, and the second phase included the bargaining over 
the re-organization of German industry.154 On April 18, 1951, six original countries signed 
the Treaty establishing the ECSC, marking a great step forward in the unification of 
European by creating the first “supranational institution” and laying the foundation for a 
more organized Europe.”155  
 With the economic and political elements of German and French cooperation 
involved in the Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan, named for French Prime Minister Rene 
Pleven, was concerned with the rearmament of Western Germany and the addition of French 
forces to the NATO military coalition. It is important to note that the Pleven Plan did not 
contain any provision that mandated German forces merge with NATO forces or that 
Germany should be made a member of NATO, and negotiations on the Pleven Plan began 
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during negotiations for the Schuman Plan.156 The Pleven Plan called for a European Army, 
or European Defense Community (EDC), that was to be placed under the control of a 
supranational authority, very similar to the ECSC created by the Schuman Plan. If the 
Germans were to be part of the European Army, but not members of NATO, the French 
believed that the European Army would not fall under the control of NATO but would 
respond to the SACEUR. The rationalization behind the Pleven Plan made Britain and the 
US, including Eisenhower, skeptical of its ability to succeed for two reasons. First, the 
structure and plans needed to create a viable national defense system were much different 
than those needed to create a coal and steel organization. The rules that created the ECSC 
were not easily translated for the creation of an army. Second, while the British were largely 
excluded from the Schuman Plan, they could not be excluded from a discussion about 
European defense.157  
The EDC: Lessons Learned 
 What can be taken as a theme from these various plans and treaties developed in an 
attempt to foster unity in Europe is the fact that the success or failure of a political union in 
Europe was tied to the progress of the creation of a unified European military.158 As 
Eisenhower noted in an address to the NATO Council meeting in Italy, “This European 
Force would serve another great purpose, it would stand alongside the Schuman Plan—
which must be successful—and the two would constitute great steps toward the goal of 
complete European unity!”159 One form of European unification could not exist without the 
other. From 1950 to 1954, the concept of the EDC occupied a dominant position on the 
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emerging Western European security structure and a central role in developing the 
foundation for European integration.160  
The EDC could not be successful unless it was supported by the three main players 
in the Western community: the US, Britain and Western Europe. Eisenhower, already aware 
that a unified Western European military effort was essential to a strong defense against a 
potential Soviet attack, would have to get Britain and Western Europe, namely France, to 
agree with the US that the EDC, including the rearmament of Western Germany, was the 
best option for the NATO countries.161     
2.3 1948-1950: NATO and Its First SACEUR  
In May 1948, the Berlin Blockade raised central questions about American foreign 
policy in relation to Germany and Western Europe.162 In addition to this definitive US break 
with the Soviets over Germany, three key events raised the urgency of the defense of 
Western Europe between 1949 and 1950: The Soviets tested an atomic bomb in August 
1949, the Communists had a victory in China in October 1949, and the Korean War began 
with the invasion of South Korea in mid-1950.163 The US and Western Europe were in 
desperate need of a unified military that was ready and willing to defend the West against 
the Soviets and communism.164 In early 1949, Europe and the US became involved in 
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negotiations for a political and military treaty structured to create defense plan against the 
building Soviet threat. The unified political and military outcome would become known as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the person who would ensure that 
Europe joined, unified, under this military command was Eisenhower. By 1949, after 
considerable discussion concerning the duration of the North Atlantic Pact, all parties 
decided that the Pact would be signed in Washington, DC on April 4.165 The Treaty marked 
the beginning of a “revolutionary and constructive experiment” in international relations.166 
With the signing of the North Atlantic Pact, the fall of the Berlin Blockade and the 
resumption of talks with the Kremlin, a “lull” was created in Washington, but not in Europe, 
which was living with the harsh military reality.167 Western Europe was low on troops after 
WWII. They had just begun rebuilding their national forces and were vulnerable to the 
impending threat of the Soviets.     
While there had been thoughts about the structure of the military arm of NATO during 
the negotiation of the Treaty, it had been decided that efforts to establish the alliance’s military 
would be taken after NATO had been successfully founded.168 By 1950, a year after the signing 
of the Treaty, NATO began focusing on the development of its military arm. President Truman 
and Secretary of State Dean Acheson stressed sending more US troops to Europe to bolster their 
military efforts, establishing a North Atlantic Defense structure, and appointing an American to 
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the position of Allied Commander in Europe. Essentially, these steps would convert “an alliance 
into a permanent defense organization (NATO),” as long as Western Europe accepted the 
rearmament of Western Germany.169 Many of the NATO nations agreed that there was a need for 
a unified European defense community, and the US was convinced “the appropriate and early 
rearming of Western Germany [was] of fundamental importance to the defense of Western 
Europe against the USSR.”170 Yet, Germany was only one of the hurdles standing in the way of 
European military unification, predominantly opposed by France, while a threat to national 
sovereignty, highlighted primarily by the British, was a second hurdle. Eisenhower would be the 
man to lead Europe over these hurdles, one at a time. President Truman would call him back to 
active duty for this important military role.   
Between 1948 and 1950, Eisenhower was relatively quiet, spending much of his time 
reflecting on his time as Supreme Allied Commander during WWII. He retired as Chief of 
Staff of the US Army, leaving active military duty for the first time in 37 years, and in 
November 1948, Eisenhower published the story of his experiences in WWII, written during 
his three-month hiatus between his work at the Pentagon and Columbia, titled Crusade in 
Europe. For the next two years, “the book was a great bestseller, serialized in newspaper 
and television, it would constitute his primary impact on the public.”171 The themes of his 
book include the global scope of war, the need for industrial and military preparedness, the 
need for teamwork, the crucial role of morale, and the need for universal sacrifice.172 
Essentially, his memoir summarized all of the lessons he had learned from his role as 
Supreme Allied Commander in WWII, and he would take these themes and lessons with him 
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as he entered into his tenure as SACEUR with NATO. Apart from his memoir, Eisenhower 
received numerous honors and the overall support of the American people for leading the 
Allies to victory in WWII. As Richard Crable noted, “He had become widely sought as a 
speaker, a political standard-bearer, and a leader of the people.”173 This was important, 
because NATO needed a well-respected, universally-accepted leader to work with the 
scattered NATO nations on a unified military force, and Eisenhower wanted to bolster his 
credentials for his run for the US presidency in 1952.174 
By the fall of 1950, Eisenhower was itching to leave his post as president of 
Columbia University, and in October, US President Truman called Eisenhower to a meeting 
where the President requested Eisenhower accept the appointment as SACEUR. Eisenhower 
replied that he was “a soldier and ready to respond to whatever orders my superiors” may 
give.175 When Eisenhower arrived in France in January 1951, he began a tour of the eleven 
European capitals of the NATO countries. One of his goals during this European tour was to 
“get from the Europeans positive commitments to NATO” that they were giving their 
defense efforts “chief priority.”176 If defense was not a top priority, it would be up to 
Eisenhower to convince the NATO countries that it needed to be a priority. Defense was the 
only priority that mattered, because without a unified Western European defense under 
NATO command, the communists and Soviets could invade Western Europe. It was up to 
Eisenhower to persuade Western Europe, especially Britain and France, of the importance of 
military unification.  
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3. ANALYSIS 
On January 1, 1951, Eisenhower arrived in France to begin the planning for the structure 
of the new command. While article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty agreed that an armed attack 
against any one of the signees would be considered an attack against the other 11, there was no 
real command structure to direct the overall defense of Western Europe should an attack on one 
of the NATO nations occur.  
In a March 1951 letter, Eisenhower noted his main purpose as Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR):  
Although my mission has economic, political, and especially morale facets, as well as 
military, SHAPE is primarily a military headquarters. And for the months to come, all 
our efforts must be bent toward the establishment and maintenance of forces adequate for 
the armed defense of Europe and powerful enough to give pause to any possible 
aggressor. If every man I have could work round the clock, even days a week, there 
would still be little time for matters other than those directly and immediately concerned 
with the military mission.177  
Eisenhower made his duty as SACEUR his first priority. He also tried, as he did during World 
War II (WWII), to avoid any political dealings. He was a soldier, a military commander; he tried 
to stick with what he knew best. Yet part of his job as SACEUR was creating a cohesive group 
of soldiers that were ready and willing to fight together against any impending Soviet or 
communist threat. In order to create a unified force, Eisenhower brought some of his lessons 
learned during his dealings with the French political elite during WWII with him during his 
various speeches around Europe.  
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Eisenhower used key master tropes, allowing me to trace how his rhetoric strategically 
argued that Germany, England, France and the remaining Western European nations, who 
previously thought of themselves as independent entities, should come together in order to 
position NATO as a foundation of a strong, international alliance and protect Western Europe 
from the well-known threat of the Soviets. A close reading of his speeches emphasizing the use 
of these tropes used throughout key speeches during Eisenhower’s term as SACEUR, alongside 
the history and context surrounding these speeches, provides a more complete understanding of 
Eisenhower’s rhetorical transactions during the early 1950s. This analysis also sheds light on the 
first attempts to unify Europe. 178 In addition, the close reading of Eisenhower’s speeches draws 
attention to the previously overlooked relationship between Eisenhower’s rhetoric and the 
formation of a joint military effort between NATO countries. Eisenhower’s toughest audience 
was the French political elite, yet he continued use tropes with various NATO audiences, helping 
maintain his argument across key audiences: The French, the British and the NATO Council.  
3.1 Metaphor 
Kenneth Burke saw metaphor as a “device for seeing something in terms of something 
else.”179 Often, a speaker will use a metaphor to help an audience understand a more abstract or 
complex concept by comparing the more complex concept to a more trivial or familiar 
concept.180 For example, the abstract concept of “freedom” can be compared to a US citizen 
burning the American flag in protest. While freedom is an abstract term that can mean various 
things to various people, the concept of burning a flag without punishment is something concrete 
that most people can understand. Eisenhower used key metaphors in a similar way, making the 
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complex idea of European unity and, in specific instances, the rearmament of Western Germany, 
to various familiar concepts. In particular, Eisenhower employed metaphors focused on 
construction, nature or travel, military efforts and science to help make the concept of a unified 
military alliance between the NATO countries a goal that was both attainable and essential to 
Western Europe’s continued security.     
Construction Metaphors 
The construction metaphor, sometimes called the edifice metaphor, is one of the most 
commonly used metaphors.181 The point of such a metaphor is show movement, either upward or 
downward. Therefore, the speaker will often start with a foundation component on which to 
build a strong case for his/ her point of view, or, if discussing an opposing viewpoint, discuss the 
demolition or tearing-down of that point of view.182 The idea of “building” is commonly used, 
especially the idea of an argument as a building or society as a building.183 Throughout his 
SACEUR rhetoric, Eisenhower implemented similar metaphors, helping his audience to better 
understand the need for European unity and how best to build that unity and cohesion within the 
framework of NATO. 
Eisenhower began his series of construction metaphors by noting the values that form the 
foundation of European unity, Eisenhower discussed the structure that helped maintain that 
foundation: SHAPE and France. In a speech to French statesmen visiting SHAPE, Eisenhower 
noted, “But, gentlemen, the solution to NATO's problems lies in the hearts and minds of the 
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millions of people that make up the population of the United States and Britain and all the other 
North Atlantic Nations to include, of course, at the very foundation of the European complex, 
this one.”184  Here, Eisenhower noted that the foundation of unity is with SHAPE, and by 
extension, France, where SHAPE was based. He reiterated this statement later in a speech in 
1952 by stating, “The past year at SHAPE has been very valuable: We have plowed difficult 
ground and established successfully the political, psychological and organizational foundations 
upon which to build.”185 Again, SHAPE provided the foundation from which to build the unified 
military needed to stand against the Soviet threat. And once that foundation was established, 
Eisenhower could effectively argue he could manage and command a NATO military force. Due 
to his immense efforts and personal responsibility to the build-up of SHAPE, and the previous 
build-up of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces during WWII, Eisenhower 
knew the importance of developing a solid foundation from which to run and command any large 
group of soldiers or military personnel.  
With the foundation of military unity set, Eisenhower implemented the edifice metaphor 
to describe the construction of a wall or barrier based on that foundation during his speech 
commemorating the seventh anniversary of the D-Day invasion of Normandy, France. 
Eisenhower gave this particular speech in Normandy, speaking to the French citizens and 
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political elite.186 Eisenhower’s experience leading the troops during the D-Day invasion made 
him an authority on the invasion and allowed him to use D-Day as a unique parallel to the 
current ideological battle between the West and the Soviets. He noted, “But we know—out of 
tragic experience—that peace can never be the portion of the divided, the fearful, or of those who 
would stand aside, in the vain hope that the hordes of tyranny might overlook them. We shall be 
strong only as we are one. And we look to the future knowing that the strength of the free nations 
can be built into an invincible barrier against aggression.”187 The metaphor here is Eisenhower’s 
statement that the strength of free nations can be considered a wall against the aggressive push of 
the communist nations. Essentially, the unified mindset of the free West could deter any threat 
the Soviets attempt to make.  
Eisenhower repeated his call for the creation of a barrier or wall in 1951 in an 
unidentified statement. Given the content of this speech, Eisenhower was likely speaking to a 
group of staff at the SHAPE based in Marly, France.188 When he spoke of the difficulty of 
creating a union among numerous nations, Eisenhower noted, “If you take fourteen grains of 
sand on the seashore and put them in your hand and attempt to make a ball of them, you would 
not be trying anything more difficult than to get fourteen independent nations working together 
for a common purpose. But we do know that we can go to another part of the countryside, get a 
bit of rock, make some cement from it and then—out of those fourteen grains of sand—create 
something that was practically indestructible.”189 Eisenhower’s allusion to fourteen grains of 
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sand directly related one grain of sand to each of the countries that constituted Western Europe in 
1950.190 His reference to cement could be explained by a speech delivered to the British 
Parliament where he noted, “Enlightened self-interest is the cement that must bind us 
together.”191 This enlightened self-interest is the idea that each of the NATO nations must come 
to realize that it is in their best interest to come together, bond, against the shared threat of 
communism. This idea of adhesion is also important, because it allowed Eisenhower to make a 
call for the coming together of individual nations, a metaphorical way of expressing Burke’s 
notion of identification.192 Unification is the best, solid defense against Soviet expansion, and it 
needed to be made by each individual nation. If it was a forced decision, if the nations were 
pushed together like the grains of sand in the palm of a hand, then they would only stay together 
for a brief amount of time before falling apart.  Eisenhower used the wall metaphor in other 
speeches, but these were the most vital, as the French were one of his most stubborn audiences 
when it came to the idea of a unified European military front.193 Helping them see the 
importance of creating a barrier against aggression was vital to his overall call for a unified 
military front. Given Eisenhower’s experience moving through TORCH and OVERLORD, he 
was well-aware of the importance of the barriers and walls needed to hold back enemy troops 
and create a secure and solid military coalition.  
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In addition to making the call for the creation of a wall between the east and west to 
separate communism from freedom-loving democracy, Eisenhower called for the destruction of 
smaller walls or barrier between the nation-states of Europe and the creation of a strong 
foundation to foster the unity he so strongly desires. Eisenhower made his call to destroy the 
barrier between the nation-states early on in his July 1951 speech to the English Speaking Union. 
This was one of the most documented speeches during Eisenhower’s tenure as SACEUR, in the 
sense that we know that this speech was received very favorably by the British audience in 
attendance and Europe as a whole.194 This meant that apart from reaching his immediate British 
audience, his speech was reprinted and circulated among all Western European nations.  The 
following metaphor appeared nearly halfway through the speech, after Eisenhower had 
established the numerous challenges to integrating Western Europe. He stated, “Europe cannot 
attain the towering material stature possible to its peoples’ skills and spirit so long as it is divided 
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by patchwork fences. They foster localized instead of common interest…In the political field, 
these barriers promote distrust and suspicion.”195 Eisenhower noted there were patchwork fences 
that separated the nations, meaning they were not strong or sturdy. He emphasized that these 
fences, or barriers as he later called them, were not in the best interest of Europe. Europeans did 
not need to be suspicious of one another but of the Soviets. They needed to demolish these 
fences and openly operate as a single unit in order to have the best chance to stand against the 
Soviets and communism. Any type of dissension in the ranks would make their defense weak. 
This particular metaphor can be tied back to Eisenhower’s development of SHAPE headquarters, 
where he only allowed American s and British to stay stationed at the headquarters if they 
developed a strong camaraderie between nationalities. Eisenhower had built coalitions during 
WWII, and was in the process of building a coalition for SHAPE. He knew well what enabled 
and what hindered that effort. 
Eisenhower went so far as to explain how to get rid of the fencing. He noted, “May we 
never forget that our common devotion to deep human values and our mutual trust are the 
bedrock of our joint strength.”196 The human values Eisenhower repeatedly mentioned 
throughout his rhetoric were freedom and prosperity, two values not associated in the Western 
mind with the communists. As long as Western Europe held strong to their commitment to 
freedom and deterrent of the Soviet/communist threat, the “barriers” between the nations could 
fall and Europe could come together as a strong alliance.  
In all these cases, Eisenhower implemented the construction or edifice metaphors well. 
He began by discussing the foundation needed to build a unified military, moved to the barrier he 
would then like to see in place against the Soviets and also calls for the destruction of barrier 
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impeding the progression to a unified Europe. These metaphors also allowed the development of 
a sense of identification with his audience. He knew his audience—the French political elite and 
SHAPE staff located in France or the British—after his dealings with the French during WWII. 
Eisenhower learned he needed to seem trustworthy and to the point when dealing with the 
French.197 During his D-Day Commemoration Speech, Eisenhower made the wall metaphor 
persuasive by identifying with his audience prior to its implementation. Going into the speech, he 
already shared a common experience with his audience: The memory of or participation in D-
Day. For the 1952 statement, he shared the experience of working at SHAPE and working 
toward the same goal: creating a structure and military command for the build-up of NATO 
forces. For the English Speaking Union, he shared the English language. During all three 
speeches, Eisenhower also cast a common threat, communism, and created a collective “we” 
within his discourse. Eisenhower never referenced himself or individual countries when 
discussing success, but he always noted “we” in relation to the SHAPE staff or the group of 
NATO countries.  By creating a sense of community, Eisenhower could better identify with his 
audience, helping make his metaphors more persuasive.198  
Military Metaphors 
As Eisenhower worked to establish the foundation and barriers used to help prevent 
Soviet expansion, he also further established the fact that there was a necessity for a unified force 
to work against a common enemy. This is when he used the military metaphor. He discussed 
how and why the West needed to attack, repulse, contain and destroy the opposing communists. 
He also reviewed when the West would be required to stand and fight and when they would need 
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to retreat, if ever.199 Most importantly, he continued to establish that the NATO countries needed 
to gradually limit their autonomy and become part of a unified military group.  During all of 
Eisenhower’s select military metaphors, he once again had a unique position from which to use 
them. He was a decorated war hero, commander and successful military strategist. He was 
entrusted with the command of the forces that lead to the end of WWII in Europe and was now 
entrusted with the protection of Europe’s freedom from communism. If anyone was going to use 
military comparisons, Eisenhower was certainly knowledgeable on the topic. 
Urgency was a key theme throughout Eisenhower’s implementation of military 
metaphors. One way he made clear the vital need for a unified military force was by comparing 
the current situation facing Western Europe, the threat of communist expansion and Soviet 
attack, to a battlefield.  While speaking to the NATO Council in Italy, Eisenhower said, “On the 
battle field, when the bullets are flying, no soldier waits for tractor to bring up a ditch-digging 
machine to get him a bit of shelter from those bullets. He gets ahold of an entrenching tool, or 
even his bayonet, and he scratches gravel; he digs into the mud, into the rocks or anything else, 
so as to get his body protected. Now, we have so long neglected our common defenses and our 
military developments that we are, in a way, in the position of that soldier on a battlefield. So 
let's grab an entrenching tool!”200 According to Eisenhower, NATO did not have that combined 
military effort is so greatly needs. The NATO countries were in grave danger from flying bullets 
metaphorically coming from the East. If they continued as they were, separate entities only 
bound by a treaty and not by a combined military, they would remain unprotected. However, if 
they realized the danger and took initiative to protect against the danger themselves, they would 
avoid a communist takeover. In order to fight against the number of forces under Soviet control, 
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the European nations needed to come together to increase the forces needed to match and 
withstand a potential Soviet attack. And an important factor for Eisenhower, Western Europe 
would be protected with minimal aid from the outside “machines” such as the US.201 Eisenhower 
felt they could move in this direction as long as Europe realized it needed to stand on its own two 
feet. Not only did Europe need to come together, they needed to come together as a proud unit, 
without foreign aid.  
While Europe was still realizing how to best come together, Eisenhower continued to 
carry on the military metaphor during the NATO Council meeting. Jean Monnet, the architect of 
the Schumann Plan and concept of the European Defense Community (EDC) had called on 
Eisenhower to call for the acceptance of European unification.202 At the meeting, Eisenhower 
compared the development of NATO forces to the forging of weapons when he said, “We are 
producing, forging, and sharpening the instruments that we require.”203 In order to craft NATO 
forces that would be the strongest available in Western Europe, Eisenhower noted the 
development of the “instruments” needed to enable his forces to succeed. These instruments 
were still moving through the same process that a piece of metal would move through in order to 
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become a useable sword in battle. The blacksmith (SHAPE and Eisenhower) began with rough 
metal (Europe at the beginning of 1951), and was now shaping that metal into a viable weapon in 
the same way Eisenhower was working to rhetorically shape Europe’s view on the need to unify 
against the Soviets. Eisenhower’s ultimate goal was to ensure Western Europe would come to 
realize the need to build their forces against their common enemy, to unify against the Soviets.   
During his speech at the D-Day Commemoration ceremony and the English Speaking 
Union dinner, Eisenhower compared the Soviets to a literal military force continuously pushing 
against the Western European countries.  During the commemoration ceremony in France, he 
said, “The integrity of all Western Europe must be defended against predatory force.”204 Just a 
month later in Britain he noted, “Subversion, propaganda, deceit and the threat of naked force are 
daily hurled against us and our friends in a globe-encircling relentless campaign.”205 This 
masculine imagery of reckless activity, danger and war, made the case that there is already a war 
happening, whether France and Britain wanted to accept it or not. They needed to take a stand 
against the continuous threat of communism, trying to sneak through the Iron Curtain on a daily 
basis. Moreover, if Eisenhower could make it seem like the Soviets were making the first attack, 
it would be less morally difficult for Britain and France to accept the fact that they needed to act 
against the Soviets. It also justified NATO and Eisenhower’s call for unity. There was a real 
threat bombarding the Western countries.206 In addition, Eisenhower was well-versed in 
identifying and articulating propaganda and deceit during his time a commander of Normandy 
forces against Hitler’s Germany; he witnessed first-hand the threat of campaign seeking to 
eradicate a certain way of being. For Hitler, this meant a campaign in favor of the eradication of 
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the non-Arian race, and for the Soviets, it meant the eradication of freedom and those not 
accepting of communism, 
Overall, Eisenhower implemented military metaphors for particular audiences. All 
instances, apart from the one metaphor used at the English Speaking Dinner, were used during a 
speech directly concerned with military efforts. The NATO Council was expecting an update on 
Eisenhower’s efforts to garner further military troops throughout Europe. The D-Day 
commemorative speech was meant to argue that the sacrifice of the soldiers on the beaches of 
Normandy would not have to be felt again, because NATO would help create a unified European 
army that would prevent the hostile takeover of France or any other Western European country 
ever again. Apart from the fact that the military metaphors were used in very appropriate 
settings, making them expected and relatable to his audience, Eisenhower was also the 
SACEUR. If anyone had the authority and ethos to compare the current situation in Europe to a 
military campaign against the Soviets, it was Eisenhower and his experiences from WWII.  
Nature Metaphors 
In addition to military metaphors, there were a myriad of metaphors used within 
discourse related to natural phenomena and the concept of a journey. Images of a ravine or gap 
that needed to be crossed, the hill that needs to be summited or the ocean that needs to be 
explored are just a few examples.207 Michael Osborn’s concept of the light-dark archetypal 
metaphor fits into this category as well.208 The journey metaphor creates a useful tool for 
speakers to discuss progress and forward movement toward a certain goal.209 Such metaphors 
help to show problem-solving as well, visualizing movement from point A to point B. There is a 
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beginning or a starting point and an end destination, and the journey metaphor is so 
“fundamental” and a “part of our collective unconscious” that it holds mass appeal to various 
audiences.210 Eisenhower used both in his SACEUR rhetoric to help his audience see the 
progress being made by SHAPE and NATO as well as help his audiences see the goal that 
NATO is traveling toward. 
One nature metaphor, describing an interconnected web, often associated with a spider’s 
web, is common in twentieth century discourse.211 In his speech to the English Speaking Union, 
Eisenhower used a web metaphor to show a barrier between his goal, European unification, and 
his current position, minimal and scattered forces.212 He noted, “But it is in that vital region, 
history, custom, language and prejudice have combined to hamper integration. Without unity, the 
effect hobbled by a web of custom barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral 
cartels, local shortages, and economic monstrosities.”213 In other words, in order to get from an 
organization of 12 separate NATO nations to a unified NATO military command, Western 
Europe needed to break through web of roadblocks. The fact that he references a spider’s web is 
also important, as Eisenhower is reinforcing that any impediment to European unity was a 
negative thing.  
Eisenhower continued his use of nature metaphors during his address at the English 
Speaking Union. Eisenhower established a clear comparison between the words of Winston 
Churchill’s call for European unity during his “Iron Curtain” address and a fruit-bearing tree. 
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Eisenhower said, “Winston Churchill’s pleas for a united Europe can yet bear such greatness of 
fruit that it may well be remembered as the most notable achievement of a career, marked by 
achievement.”214 At the time of Churchill’s speech, the speech and the idea of a unified Europe 
was not favorably accepted. Within that particular speech, one that should have been well-known 
by his British audience at the dinner, Churchill called for the US and Britain to labor together to 
build a brotherhood against the Soviet communist policy, something very similar to what 
Eisenhower was trying to do during his time as SACEUR.215 While Britain was one of the largest 
voices against European unity, because unification posed a threat to their sovereign authority and 
favored separation from the rest of mainland Europe, Eisenhower’s reference to Britain’s own 
Prime Minister gave his argument further credibility. Churchill’s call was essentially compared 
to a fruit-bearing tree.216 If Churchill’s call for unity were given support, then Eisenhower’s call 
for European unity would also earn support from the British. Their support, very similar to the 
nutrients given to a tree, would aid in creating a unified Europe, fostering freedom from 
communism and Soviet expansion on a continual basis given a strong foundation, similar to the 
perennial fruit on a tree.  
Later in the same speech, Eisenhower compared the lack of freedom to a harvested and 
dying flower. He stated, “Freedom has its life in the heart, the actions, and the spirit of men and 
so it must be duly earned and refreshed—else like a flower cut from its life giving roots, it will 
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wither and die.”217 In order for a flower to thrive, it needs to be given fertilizer and water, which 
it absorbs through its root system. Without its roots, Eisenhower noted, the flower dies from a 
lack of nutrients.  Like a flower, freedom needs the personal conviction and belief of men to 
thrive. If men begin to take freedom for granted or stop continually fighting to keep their 
freedom, it will be at risk of loss. Freedom is delicate and must be nurtured.218 This is why 
Eisenhower was pushing so hard for the creation of a unified military front, because sovereign 
nations only remain sovereign if they can be protected from external threats, such as the Soviets.  
The fact that Eisenhower compared freedom to a flower is also significant because 
flowers are often used exclusively to describe females versus males.219 Stereotypically, 
especially during the early 1950s, women needed to be protected from the outside world, and 
their place was in the home, specifically the kitchen.220 The most visible image in America 
during the 1950s was the suburban family, living in their single-family home behind a white 
picket fence. A man’s job paid the mortgage; he was the “breadwinner” while the woman kept 
the house as the “homemaker.”221 The woman was free to express herself, but only from the 
security of her kitchen. Similarly, freedom needed to be protected from the Soviet and 
communist threats outside the walls of the Western Europe “home.” The male soldiers needed to 
band together to protect their homes and their freedom from any threat. In terms of the fruit-
bearing tree and floral metaphors, Eisenhower had a unique vantage point from which to use 
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these metaphors because of his time as a solider and military commander during WWII. Soldiers 
must protect freedom, and they must also protect women and children. The fact that liberty is 
mentioned also implies lady liberty, in need of protection. As a soldier, there are few others with 
the experience needed to discuss the value and necessity of protection and defense. 
Finally, Eisenhower implemented a nature metaphor related to water, depicting the end 
results for NATO should their efforts to build a unified Europe fail. He said, “We will be nothing 
more than a feeble ripple, washed away and forgotten.”222 Water has been tied to six various 
ideas in various studies: nature, life sustainer, movement, power, purity and femininity.223 In this 
case, due to the fact that Eisenhower qualified the ripple of water as “feeble,” Eisenhower was 
tying water directly to the idea of power. Water generally moves, and has power in that 
movement. Water runs downstream; it is seen as forceful and persistent. But if the water 
becomes stagnant, it loses its power. If the NATO countries did not keep moving in the direction 
of their goal, they would lose their power and not be able to fight against the Soviets. If they lost 
the momentum of building their unified military coalition, it could give the Soviets or 
communists just the opening they need to invade the NATO countries. Moreover, if Eisenhower 
meant to tie his use of the water metaphor back to the concept of life sustainer and femininity, 
then once again, as a solider, he was uniquely positioned to use this metaphor in a powerful and 
meaningful way for his audience. 
Through his use of nature metaphors, Eisenhower proved that the negative web of 
barriers forming in Britain against the efforts of NATO could be easily removed. Eisenhower 
cast a common threat, and created a collective “we” within his discourse. Eisenhower never 
referenced himself or individual countries when discussing success, but he always noted “we” in 
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relation to the SHAPE staff or the NATO countries. The only time he diverged from his use of 
the collective “we” was when he was trying to bolster the position of the French, singling them 
out in an attempt to give them a leadership role in the fight against communist.  
Journey Metaphors 
In addition to Eisenhower’s implementation of metaphors directly related to nature, he 
often used metaphors related to a journey or traveling over time. A clear example of this was 
during his talks with a group of French statesman at SHAPE and a discussion with members of 
the British Parliament, in which he alludes to the urgency of unifying Europe. To the French he 
stated, “If we need security, let's get it now…Now that is the only time schedule that I can see 
applies to [earning security]. Because, if you are out in the Bay swimming for your life, you 
don't say, ‘I must reach the land by evening, or I won't reach it.’ You'll say, ‘I bloody well have 
got to reach the land.’ That's what you say, and that's what we say now.”224 And just two months 
later, he made this comment, almost identical, to the British parliament, “If you are drowning in 
the middle of the river you don't say 'I can't swim as far as the shore,’ you just swim. At least, 
you don't give up. That's where we are.”225 His urgency likely came from various sources, 
including US intelligence reports at the time, verifying the fact that the Soviets would be capable 
of attack on the West at any time.226 Given this fact, it was vital that the French and the British 
agreed that they did not have time to tread water and potentially drown. They needed to take 
action and move forward with the request of the Schumann Plan and the proposed European 
defense community. Inaction would cause them to drown and lose the one thing they have fought 
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to maintain throughout already devastating conflicts: freedom. During his time as commander of 
forces for OVERLORD, Eisenhower learned the meaning of fighting for freedom at all costs, 
with more than 9,000 Allied soldiers killed or wounded during the Normandy campaign.227  
Apart from the urgency of the journey, there were bound to be obstacles or pitfalls that 
the NATO countries needed to avoid so they did not endanger their journey or stall the progress 
toward European unity that was so urgently required.228  When speaking at the English Speaking 
Union, Eisenhower noted, “The road ahead may be long—it is certain to be marked by critical 
and difficult passages. But if we march together, endure together, share together, we shall 
succeed—we shall gloriously succeed together!”229 At this point, Eisenhower was looking 
forward. There was much to still do, especially with regards to Britain’s support of a unified 
European military, and getting from disagreement to agreement on how to involve Britain in the 
goal of unity needed to be done as directly and without hindrance as possible.   
Also, inherent an inherent component of the journey metaphor is the idea of a burden, another 
form of an obstacle, something heavy or cumbersome that makes the journey more difficult than 
needed. When speaking to the NATO Council in Rome, that burden was caution. Eisenhower 
said, “I believe that if we, now, allow the influence of traditionalism, cautious approach, 
calculations as to what is politically feasible, and if we are burdened too much by all other 
deterrent influences that affect men—if we allow these influences to keep us from positive and 
direct action, there will be nothing in history about us and the organization we represent.”230 The 
idea of getting rid of the burdens and obstacles in that impede the journey again brought 
recognition to the urgency and immediacy of the threat of the Soviets. As noted before, the threat 
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of the Soviets was not up for debate; Western Europe was well-aware that the communists and 
Soviets were a threat. Eisenhower’s goal was to push the fact that they were an immediate threat, 
and this meant that the build-up of NATO forces was urgent and required without delay.  
In both cases, metaphors referencing obstacles and burdens during a journey, can  be tied 
back to Eisenhower’s numerous negotiations and setbacks during his discussions with Giraud, 
Darlan and de Gaulle in preparation for operations TORCH and OVERLORD. Giraud’s 
unrealistic demands for power, Darlan’s assassination and de Gaulle’s demand to become the 
recognized leader of a revitalized French government were just some of the political challenges 
that stood in the way of Eisenhower’s military goals during WWII. However, once those 
obstacles were overcome, Eisenhower led his forces to victory, just as Western Europe will 
overcome the Soviet threat if they can overcome their preference for caution and inaction.  
Through these particular speeches, Eisenhower employed journey metaphors, reiterating that 
while some barriers to the end goal, continued freedom with a unified military defense, they 
were also barriers that could be overturned or overcome. These barriers needed to be demolished 
quickly and without delay, because “we,” or Western Europe, did not have the luxury of time. As 
a unified group, the NATO countries needed to move forward and work together to create a joint 
military front against the Soviets.231 
Archetypal Metaphors 
Eisenhower implemented metaphors that can fall into both journey and nature categories, 
creating a hybrid metaphor that shows progress is being made and the end result will be positive 
for those involved in the journey.232 In particular, he used archetypal metaphors, depicting the 
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light-dark dichotomy. While speaking on the second anniversary of SHAPE in France, 
Eisenhower made it clear that the past year’s efforts were not in vain. He noted, “Only this week, 
my staff and I have prepared a report on the progress we have achieved. One of its purposes will 
be to fight any discouragement that might come about from the realization that objectives are 
still a long way off on the horizon—by glancing briefly over our shoulders to see how far we 
have come.”233 NATO and SHAPE had accomplished a lot over the past year, but good times 
and unity were ahead on the horizon, in the future, a place where the sun rises, while the past, the 
darkness, must only be given a quick glance. This reassuring movement from dark to light 
helped the SHAPE staff remain steadfast in the face of a long journey ahead.  
Eisenhower also employed a similar metaphor when speaking to the Academy of Moral 
and Political Sciences of the Institute of France. Here, Eisenhower compared France to a beacon. 
He said, “History and destiny, tradition and geography, have combined through the years to 
focus the eye of people all over the world on this great land. They look to France as a beacon of 
freedom and progress along the long and arduous road towards human happiness.”234 Based on 
his dealings with the French in WWII, Eisenhower knew he had to make his arguments clear and 
concise when dealing with the French. By comparing France to a beacon of light, a guiding light 
and example to be seen by the rest of Europe, he helped bolster the French ego and make his call 
for European unity all the more palatable. If the French were going to share glory with anyone, at 
least they would be seen as the group that made that glory possible.  
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Through these speeches, Eisenhower employed archetypal metaphors of light and dark to 
help emphasize his previous use of the journey metaphors: NATO would continue to move 
forward along the road, moving toward the light and bright future and away from the past and 
potential darkness that would come from Soviet and communist expansion. Eisenhower’s 
declaration of confidence in the future, something needed to ensure his audience that NATOs 
efforts were not in vain, helped enhance his ethos, suggesting he was a man of great faith.235 
Additionally, the dark and light dichotomy allowed Eisenhower to emphasize the good (light) 
aspect of NATOs call for a unified European force against the evil (dark) aspect of the build-up 
of the Soviet and communist threat. This comparison between one group and another continues 
as Eisenhower employed other metaphors in his rhetoric. 
Scientific Metaphors 
Scientific metaphors allow the speaker to compare one group or universe to some other 
domain. For example, a speaker could say that the human mind/brain is a computer. This would 
emphasize the fact that the brain, like a computer, contains a place to store data (a hard drive) 
and the ability to understand information (a processor).236 Eisenhower used scientific metaphors 
during two specific occasions within the selected speeches to French statesmen at SHAPE and 
the British Parliament. Both occasions involved the same vehicle term, a vacuum, but separate 
tenor terms, Europe and West Germany. To the French, Eisenhower stated, “But we know that 
that center of Europe is not going to remain a vacuum. It is not going to remain completely 
outside of this ideological struggle of freedom on the one hand and regimentation on the other. 
We must absorb the major part of the European strength, of that German strength or it would 
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assuredly go the other way.”237 To the British, not two months later, Eisenhower made a similar 
statement, “And we know Western Germany is not going to remain a vacuum. And, in the same 
way, every needle is going to point to one of the poles. And, in the same way, every country in 
the world has to make up its mind, as long as power has become polarized; are you going to cling 
to the Free World concept, or are you going to accept without protest the authoritarian rule?”238  
These two metaphors can be taken together, because they are working toward the same 
goal. Both seek to convince the audience that while Europe may seem safe and secure at the 
moment, it will not remain secure forever. The “security vacuum” surrounding Europe and West 
Germany could at any time be overcome by the domination of a greater power influence, such as 
the Soviets. The British and the French could not remain content to assume the Soviet influence 
will not eventually infiltrate their borders, and they should greatly consider joining the EDC and 
rearming Western Germany under NATO. Yet France led the charge against German 
rearmament, partially because they feared another possible attack from the Germans if the 
country were rearmed.239 Eisenhower had sympathy for the French situation, but he again called 
for their understanding and acceptance of the need for German rearmament. If West Germany 
fell under Soviet control, there would be no way to defend against an attack on the NATO 
countries. If Germany stayed as it was, unarmed and simply occupied by Western Europe, then 
NATO could only hope to create a stalemate with the Soviets. The only way to defeat the 
Soviets, should they attack, would be to garner German cooperation and forces to fight with the 
French, British and remainder of NATO forces.240 If anyone would know the number of troops 
or the strength of forces needed to withhold the potential invasion or bombardment from the 
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Soviets, it would be Eisenhower. Based on his of more than 40 years of military service, 
Eisenhower participated in and planned numerous military campaigns and was well-aware of the 
numerous aspects of their planning, including troop sizes, weaponry and threat levels. 
Overall, Eisenhower used metaphors within his SACEUR rhetoric to make the complex 
idea of European unity and, in specific instances, the rearmament of Western Germany, more 
tangible for his French, British and NATO audiences. In particular, Eisenhower employed 
metaphors focused on construction, nature, travel, military efforts, light, and science to help 
make the concept of a unified military alliance between the NATO countries a goal that was both 
attainable and very much essential for Western Europe. Construction metaphors allowed 
Eisenhower to liken unity to the foundation of the strongest defense against the Soviets. Military 
and scientific metaphors helped Eisenhower emphasize the urgency behind his call for unity. On 
the battlefield, Western Europe needed to be on the offense, and in order to do so, they needed 
the help of Western German forces to bolster their manpower. Nature metaphors allowed for the 
setbacks and obstacles that might try to prevent European unification, while journey metaphors 
enabled Eisenhower to explain how the NATO countries could ultimately overcome those 
obstacles together. Metaphor allowed Eisenhower to make abstract ideas such as unification a 
tangible and positive idea for his audiences. His use of irony only further helped emphasize the 
need for unification.       
3.2 Irony 
 
Irony involves the pairing of two dialectics and occurs when a speaker tries to produce 
meaning that takes into account both terms at the same time.241 Irony can only be used 
effectively if the audience is certain about the speaker’s opinion on the terms or concepts used 
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within the ironic statement. 242 Eisenhower used irony in key instances, using Burke’s concept of 
“true” irony more than romantic irony. In particular, Eisenhower used irony when discussing the 
motives of the communists and his role within NATO.  
During his D-Day Commemoration speech in Normandy, Eisenhower used irony as a 
way of creating group cohesion over the fact that the Communist’s motives are not as “peaceful” 
as the motives of NATO. He said, “We know that we want only a peace among nations that will 
permit all men—of East and West alike—to live decent and productive lives. The rulers of the 
Communistic world say that their purpose is the same.”243 However, Eisenhower made it clear 
that the communist purpose is not peaceful in both the remainder of this speech and his personal 
letters; his audience was well-aware he was being ironic, pairing the two dialectics of 
communism and peace, in order to emphasize how different the communists were from the moral 
ideals of the West. The communists wanted to acquire new territories and occupy lands, while 
Western Europeans simply wanted to keep the communists out of Europe to maintain peace and 
solidarity between the 12 European nations.244 To make this point even clearer, in case his 
audience was not already aware of his position and feelings on the communists and Soviets, he 
continued by saying, “But how can we believe those who talk of liberty when they permit no 
liberty at home; who promise benefits to the workers although millions labor in their slave 
camps; who speak of peasant problems with mock sympathy after wrenching from the peasants 
at home their land and produce? How can we believe those who talk of peace while they support 
                                                           
242 David Kaufer, 94. 
243 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “D-Day Commemoration Ceremonies,” June 6, 1951.  
244 In a diary entry dated a month after this speech, Eisenhower wrote, “With respect to these things, my own 
reaction is that the stopping of the Communist acquisition of new territories is so important that it is up to us to 
inspire better understanding and better cooperation in the areas that seem unusually important to our future than 
Europe; in fact, it is difficult for me to see how we would ever stop the progressive disintegration of the entire 
European, African, Asian, and possibly even parts of south American areas if Europe should fall.” The Papers of 
Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XII, Letter 292 to Sterling Morton. Morton was the chairman of the board of the 
Morton Salt Company in Chicago. 
  
74 
aggression in the Orient and arm Eastern Germany in the face of no conceivable threat?”245 This 
follow-up comment drove home the idea that while the communists might try to make it seem 
like they want “all men to live decent lives,” but based on the continuous threat of Soviet and 
communist expansion, Eisenhower made it clear neither party was concerned for the wellbeing 
of others.   
Eisenhower also used irony during his NATO Farewell Address from France to the 
NATO Council members. He said, “Ladies and gentlemen, I am certainly in a unique position. 
You know, you are my bosses and usually one does not go around giving good advice and 
lecturing to his bosses, so I will try today to avoid being in the position of teacher or preacher. I 
shall try to tell you, in my own way, something of what I think of this Group, something of my 
respect for its opportunities for service, its capacity for good in the world today.”246 This 
statement was ironic for two reasons. First, it was the first sentence of his speech. So in order to 
be true and not ironic, Eisenhower would have had to have not made any lasting requests for how 
NATO should carry on or run after he left. This was not the case. Throughout the speech, 
Eisenhower discussed the “duties” each of the Council members has to work with their member 
countries to continue to develop the “rights and privileges of free people” and “unity” as their 
primary job and responsibility. This sounded like Eisenhower’s final opportunity to preach his 
goal of European unity and a strong military coalition to the NATO Council. This was important 
because it was the last time Eisenhower addressed NATO, and he needed this speech to 
encapsulate his accomplishments and hopes that the organization would continue to move 
forward with the positive momentum he helped create. His methods were working, and the next 
SACEUR and the remaining NATO Council needed to continue along his path.  
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Second, this is an ironic statement, because those closest to Eisenhower and familiar with 
his previous rhetoric from WWII knew that he often referred to himself as a leader and member 
of the Crusade for Freedom. Eisenhower’s memoir of his experiences during his command 
during WWII was titled Crusade in Europe. In March 1951, Eisenhower wrote that he had 
“joined the Crusade for Freedom once more,” in a letter.247 Eisenhower also launched the 
Crusade for Freedom campaign nationwide in the US during the summer of 1950. The Crusade 
was meant to provide a way for Americans to exemplify their indignation with the Soviets and 
communists.248 Eisenhower wanted to help Western Europe exemplify their indignation with the 
Soviets as well.    
Overall, Eisenhower used irony when discussing the motives of the communists, the 
spirit of the NATO countries and his role within NATO. In particular, he noted the extreme 
opposition between the motives of the communists (domination) and the motives of the NATO 
countries (freedom). Endurance and spirit were traits NATO countries, as exemplified by France, 
needed to defeat the Soviets. And finally, Eisenhower’s word was that of a hypothetical 
preacher, a trusted leader who’s advice should be adhered to even after his departure from his 
position as SACEUR, because the crusade against the Soviets and in favor of freedom was not a 
task that would depart NATO with Eisenhower. Irony emphasized Eisenhower’s already clear 
position in relation to the Soviet threat and helped further engrain in his audience the need for a 
united front against communist expansion. 
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3.3 Synecdoche 
Synecdoche implies an integral relationship, a relationship of convertibility, between two 
terms.249 The two terms represent a conversion from part for whole, whole for part, cause for 
effect and effect for cause; it is a very interchangeable and organic relationship. Synecdoche is 
an interesting trope, uniting two things that are different from each other or representing 
intangible ideas or emotions. An example comes from environmental literature, in which a fish 
used by Native American tribes can come to represent a conflict between the tribe and the 
proponents of a reservoir to be created in a river used for spawning on the reservation.250 
Eisenhower used similar instances of metonymy when he discussed the threat of communism to 
Western Europe, making the threat not only real, but a representation of Adolf Hitler’s Germany. 
During Hitler’s rule in Germany and Joseph Stalin’s rule of the Soviet Union during 
WWII, the concept of the purge of those that did not adhere to the Nazi or Fascists philosophy is 
somewhat well-known.251 If an individual was not a Nazi, “he [was] wiped out” even if he 
eventually wanted to “swallow his past and accept Adolf Hitler’s leadership.”252 Eisenhower 
used this common image of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union during WWII to draw a 
distinct parallel between the actions of these dictators and the potential actions of the 
communists and Soviets during the English Speaking Dinner. He said, “The drawn and haunted 
faces in the docks of the purge courts are grim evidence of what Communistic domination 
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means.”253 One of the more well-known purges of those unwilling to accept the Nazi regime was 
a series of political murders known as the Operation Hummingbird, in which more than 100 
people were killed and more than a thousand imprisoned for refusing to follow Hitler.254 Hitler’s 
reign was one of zero tolerance towards opposition. Nazi unity was coerced, a characteristic 
Eisenhower also associated with Soviet and communist unity. The NATO countries needed to 
enter into a unified coalition of their own free will.  
Eisenhower went on to characterize the actions of NATO in direct opposition to the 
actions of the Nazi’s. NATO would never threaten its member countries with the fear of being 
placed in a concentration camp. During his remarks at the opening is SHAPE headquarters he 
said, “We strive to lift from the hearts of men the fear of the cell block and the slave camp. We 
strive to establish a 'Pax Atlantica' under which all men may push forward to new heights, to new 
levels of achievement.”255 The fears of the Nazi cell block or concentration slave camps were not 
needed to mobilize and unify the NATO nations. The “Pax Atlantica” helps develop the sense 
that the NATO union is one of peace and friendship between member nations as people. The 
term “pax” can mean peace, a truce or, in some cases, a friendship.256 Eisenhower repeated a 
similar statement at the English Speaking Union Dinner in London, where he stated, “Our 
community possesses a potential might that far surpasses the sinister forces of slave camps and 
chained millions.”257 The use of the term “community” again fostered a sense of unity without 
coercion. His final reference to Hitler’s Nazi regime and Stalin’s Fascist dictatorship was during 
his address to the NATO Council. He noted, “For you are not trying to lead any captives in 
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chains down the streets of any NATO city. You are seeking no triumph, except the triumph of 
giving free men the right and opportunity to live as they desire.”258 NATO needed to ensure 
those that signed the North Atlantic Treaty would remain free from communist oppression.  
 For Eisenhower, synecdoche allowed him to reduce communism, the Soviet threat, and 
the fear associated with them into tangible ideas. He made the potential invasion of the 
communists into Western Europe equivalent to the takeover of Germany by Hitler’s Nazi regime. 
The fact that Hitler’s actions were a not-to-distant memory in the minds of his various audiences 
helped add to Eisenhower’s emphasis of the urgency and reality of the Soviet threat. A threat that 
called for a defense against a possible enemy of Hitler’s caliber. A threat that require a unified 
European military effort under unified command, namely NATO. Eisenhower was in a unique 
position to use the purge courts and concentration camps as interchangeable references for Nazi 
Germany, because he was actively involved in the WWII conflict with the Germans. 
Eisenhower’s use of synecdoche in relation to Hitler’s Germany made the very recent horrors of 
the Nazi regime just the threatening potential outcome for Eisenhower to imply could happen 
again if the Soviets were to gain a foothold in Western Europe.  
3.4 Metonymy 
 
 Burke described the basic “strategy” in metonymy as being able to “convey some 
incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible.”259 Easily understandable 
examples are the use of the term Hollywood in place of American cinema studios or the term 
Westminster in place of the British Parliament because both are the well-known locations for 
each and are often associated with one another. Various films or government representatives are 
reduced to a single city or single location. In his SACEUR rhetoric, Eisenhower uses metonymy 
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to represent conflict between the Soviets and the NATO countries. In particular, he used 
metonymy to cast the Soviets and communists as untrustworthy and deceptive.   
 During his speeches to the NATO Council in Italy and his Farewell Address to the 
NATO Council in France, Eisenhower used the idea of murder, a deceptive and horrific act, as a 
way of depicting the Soviets and communists as untrustworthy.  In Italy, he claimed, “In direct 
comparison with the dictatorship that has announced its implacable hostility to our way of life, 
there is only one thing in which we are inferior. This is the unity, in his case achieved by pistol in 
the back. Free men don't have to use such methods.”260 First, Eisenhower compares the Soviets 
and communists to dictators, a factor that played into the beginnings of WWII, both Adolf Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini were considered dictators, untrustworthy and after absolute power and 
authority over all of their subjects.261 The pistol in the back can be linked to the idea of being 
taken hostage, especially in the context of the rest of the sentence and the speech, and had been 
used previously to characterize the actions of Mussolini.262 A gun in the back became associated 
with Mussolini and other dictator-like leaders, such as Hitler. Eisenhower was making the point 
that the unity achieved by the communists and the Soviets is a unity driven by fear and force. 
Those under dictators fear that if they do not comply they will be shot in the back. Being shot it 
the back is also deceptive, a killer that is too weak and pitiful to look his or her victim in the eye 
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before taking their life. It made the communist unity untrustworthy and frail, implying the 
NATO countries were trustworthy and unified by free will.      
During his farewell address to the NATO Council in France, Eisenhower made a similar 
point but further distinguished between the Western European alliance and the communist 
alliance. He stated, “Now the Communist uses the gun in the kidneys—a knife between the 
shoulder blades—and of course people are unified or else they do not exist.”263 Again, the gun in 
the kidneys and the knives between the shoulder blades depict a forced or coerced unity. It is as 
if the individuals following the communist ideals were hostages. If they were ever to go against 
their leaders, they would be killed as Eisenhower noted. Moreover, a gun in the back once again 
implied deception and a clear association with a dictatorial regime meant to mirror the current 
actions of the Soviets. 
Eisenhower also noted that while the communists were represented with weapons to the 
back, the NATO countries were joined together by friendship and a common understanding. 
There was no cohesion. Eisenhower stated, “We have to find better ways. One of the ways is this 
body and I can see the development of friendship, understanding, unity as a primary job of you 
gentlemen who stand in the front row and bear heavy responsibilities.”264 According to 
Eisenhower’s use of metonymy, NATO stood in the front row, not the back, when it came to 
leading the call for a unified Western European military. This unity was best represented by a 
friend-to-friend relationship while the Soviet’s and communist’s unity is best represented by an 
aggressor-to-hostage relationship.  
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Metonymy is a powerful trope because it has the ability to affect perception or summarize 
a situation or set of contexts.265 The gun and knife to the back are used as representative 
anecdotes that connect two sides of the equation: communists and unification. The relationship is 
a forced relationship, and without the fear and force, the communist and Soviet unity would fail. 
Therefore, Eisenhower argues the NATO can form a unified European coalition based not on 
fear but on friendship. Bonds of friendship are bonds of choice and are much more difficult to 
break over time. In particular, the ties of forced unity linking back to Hitler’s Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy, two dictators still fresh in the minds of European citizens not that far past 
WWII helped Eisenhower remind his audiences that both dictators were overcome by a unified 
Allied coalition. A similar coalition was needed now to face the deceptive communists in their 
omnipresent threat to European freedom.  Eisenhower used metonymy in a similar sense, 
reducing the actions of the Soviets and communist to mirror Hitler’s Germany. He could 
effectively and convincingly do so, because he had the first-hand experience in dealing with 
Hitler’s regimes and military coalitions during WWII.   
 
 
  
                                                           
265 Karen A. Foss and Kathy l. Domenici, 242. 
  
82 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
 On July 16, 1951, Andre Laguerre, a Life magazine reporter, wrote the following about 
Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR): “For in West Europe this 
summer the US is engaged in a colossal task not merely of physical reconstruction or military 
rearmament but primarily of moral and psychological regeneration. In this sense the Eisenhower 
mission—far more even than the Marshall Plan—is a historic enterprise without parallel.”266 
Over many centuries, Europe had experienced a myriad of alliances, but none had ever bound all 
the nations to a single treaty. Trust between the nations did not come easily, but it was gradually 
and firmly established through Eisenhower’s diplomacy and leadership during the early 1950s. 
Eisenhower’s greatest enduring contribution during his NATO service was his effort to develop a 
feeling of partnership, unification and a restoration of confidence among the European nations. 
This was an unacknowledged step towards the creation of today’s European Union that was only 
possible within the specific context of Eisenhower’s previous experiences during World War II 
(WWII) and the founding years of NATO, including the previous attempts made at unifying the 
Western European nations. 
 During his time as Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower developed his persuasive 
strategies between 1942 and 1945. During Operation TORCH, he had numerous political 
dealings and strategic conversations with some of France’s most elite political leadership: 
Giraud, Darlan and de Gaulle. And while Eisenhower went into TORCH knowing little of the 
political atmosphere within France, he soon learned that the political disagreements between 
French leadership and the military planning for the Allied forces were enmeshed. While Giraud 
                                                           
266 Andre Laguerre, “Optimist in Arms,” Life, July 16, 1951, 108. According to the article, Laguerre spent weeks 
following Eisenhower on his early 1951 journey around to the NATO countries’ capital cities. As he followed 
Eisenhower, he spoke with defense ministers, chiefs of staff, politicians and businessmen that noted “the heart of 
Europe [was] beating more strongly than any time since WWII.” 
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seemed like the best person suited to lead the Vichy forces in Africa, he held no real political 
power within the Vichy regime. Darlan did hold such power, but due to his overzealous desire to 
earn greater political authority and unfavorable relationship with the British, he was not the best 
choice for a military commander.  
During Operation OVERLORD, Eisenhower needed to court a French official that was 
not favored by Roosevelt and Churchill, Charles de Gaulle. While de Gaulle and Eisenhower had 
worked together during TORCH, Eisenhower needed to keep his trust in order to have the help 
of the French Resistance forces in the final push against Germany on the beaches of Normandy. 
Eisenhower’s trustworthy and honest nature helped him work well with French leadership. His 
calm demeanor and lack of ruthlessness helped him smooth over differences not only within the 
Vichy French and Resistance regimes, but between the American, British and French leadership. 
His patience helped him wait it out until he could get what he wanted from his counterparts. 
After WWII, various events between 1948 and 1950 provided a solid backdrop from which 
Eisenhower could eventually make his call for European unification while SACEUR.  
In order for the US and Europe to best defend themselves from the threat of Soviet and 
communist expansion, the countries needed to establish an organized, cooperative Western 
Europe. The Marshall Plan, the Treaty of Brussels, the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were 
all efforts that served as the base for the concept of the unified European defense effort needed in 
order for the political union of the Western European nations to occur under NATOs watch. The 
Marshall Plan and the Treaty of Brussels were meant to be types of economic stimulus for a 
unified Western Europe, enabling European countries to balance their budgets. While it was 
ultimately ineffective in that regard, it did create the Committee on European Economic 
Cooperation, meant to help Western European countries monitor their progress during WWII 
  
84 
recovery efforts. The Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were attempts by France to foster unity 
among Western European nations while still maintaining their first priority: national sovereignty. 
Having suffered various German invasions during the past century, the French were resistant to 
the rearmament of their greatest historical opponent.  All four of these major treaties and plans 
ended with the eventual creation of a “supranational institution” designed to help govern various 
aspects of European development or recovery. All were difficult to pass or eventually failed 
because the British and French would continue to push for national interest and sovereignty.  
During his time as SACEUR Eisenhower made his call for transnational action and 
cooperation among the Western European nations, paying particular attention to his most 
difficult audiences, the British and French. During his various speeches, Eisenhower made his 
call for a unified Western European military effort against the Soviets. His identification with 
and persuasion of his audience were created through his use of Burke’s four master tropes—
metaphor, irony, synecdoche and metonymy. All four of these tropes were used to discover and 
describe “the truth,” as Eisenhower saw it, to the rest of Western Europe.267 He also used tropes 
to connect his ideas and opinion of a unified Western European military with conduct that was or 
was not admirable to his audience. For example, communism was tied to the enslavement of 
millions while European unity was compared to a protective wall. Eisenhower was aware of his 
audience’s opinions and morals, and he used those opinions to his advantage.268 Overall, he was 
able to persuade his audience using these four tropes, because he played to their moral values, 
their opinions and “truths” within the specific context of their shared experiences of WWII. 
 
 
                                                           
267 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” 421. 
268 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 54-55. 
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Themes of Eisenhower’s SACEUR Rhetoric 
 There are numerous themes present throughout Eisenhower’s use of tropes as tools of 
persuasion with his key audiences: the British, French and NATO elite.  
Eisenhower used various tropes to call attention to shared experiences with his audiences. WWII 
was by far his largest shared experience, relevant to the French, British and other NATO 
countries for various reasons.269 During his speech to commemorate D-Day, the WWII invasion 
that ended the war in Western Europe, Eisenhower referenced the shared “tragic experience” of 
nations that refuse to stand against the aggression of dictators by crafting an “invincible” and 
metaphoric “barrier against aggression” as the Allied forces did.270 The Western European 
nations also shared the common values of freedom and prosperity, values not associated with the 
communist or Soviet Union.  
These common values also needed to be defended on the “battlefield” against Western 
Europe’s shared enemies to the East. Essentially, Eisenhower used his rhetoric to swap out the 
threat of German rearmament with the threat of Soviet attack. He made the Soviet threat a 
greater enemy, requiring France and the remainder of Western Europe to come to terms with the 
fact that German rearmament was a necessary addition to NATOs defenses against the Soviets. 
The fact that Western Europe had a single enemy, large enough to mount an attack against them 
at any time, made Eisenhower’s call for unity once of urgency. The Soviet and communist threat 
were compared to the bullets on the battlefield, and Western Europe needed to either forge their 
own armor as soon as possible, or suffer traumatic loss. Eisenhower’s discussion of NATOs 
                                                           
269 This was also a problem, because WWII brought with it memories of an uncontrollable, Nazi Germany. 
Memories of WWII were one of the main reasons why France was so adamant to keep the German’s unarmed. 
Eisenhower had to work around this, making it work to his advantage. He did this by partially placing most of the 
blame for Germany’s actions on Adolf Hitler, using metonymy to make his point that the German people were 
enslaved, imprisoned, and had to choice but to follow Hitler. Now, given the choice between Western Europe and 
the Soviets, Germany would undoubtedly choose Western Europe and remain nonthreatening, especially under the 
control of NATO. 
270 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “D-Day Commemoration Ceremonies,” June 6, 1951. 
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actions as a journey, moving along a path, also aided his call for urgency. The NATO nations 
were always moving away from the past and toward a bright future, especially with the help of 
the efforts from France, a beacon for the rest of Europe. Eisenhower’s comparison of the Soviet 
and communist threat to the actions of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin’s dictatorships also created a 
sense of urgency in combating their enemy. Western Europe had witnessed first-hand the purge 
courts, concentration camps and enslavement wrought by dictators, and if they wanted to 
maintain their freedom, they could not allow the Soviets to gain any kind of foothold in Western 
Europe. The longer they waited to prevent an attack, the more vulnerable they would become. 
There was only so much outside help, especially from the US, could do. Western Europeans 
needed to join together to defend their shared values. 
These values were shared by all of the people in Eisenhower’s audiences, referenced 
throughout his speeches simply as “we.” When Eisenhower noted that “we” were engaged in 
producing a military effort against the Soviets, he is referencing the all the Western European 
states and all the NATO member countries. When Eisenhower noted that “we” would become 
nothing more than a feeble ripple of water should the Soviets gain influence, he was referring to 
Western Europe but also to the NATO organization. NATO was created to help deter the Soviet 
threat. If NATO did not continue to make progress, gaining additional member countries and 
moving along its path to deter the communist threat, then the “we” in Western Europe would 
have been lost.  
Eisenhower’s use of tropes to persuade his audiences through shared experiences, 
common enemies and sense of collectivity helped foster a sense of community and camaraderie 
that could only have been established by an individual with Eisenhower’s history—he was the 
man responsible for leading the Allies to victory against Hitler and Germany—and universal 
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respect across European nations. Eisenhower was known for bringing diverse and conflicting 
individuals together—his time in operation TORCH and OVERLORD provided him with the 
patience and straightforward nature needed to be an honest and trustworthy speaker. His military 
background also gave him the ability to stay just far enough removed from the need for political 
gain within Europe to focus his efforts on the military front.271 This was essential, because 
without a unified military effort, Europe would never have begun to come together politically to 
form the foundation for the European Union.  
A unified European defense community was the beginning of that military unification, 
and the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty was signed on May 27, 1952, just six days 
after Eisenhower’s Farewell address to NATO. And while the EDC Treaty was never ratified in 
the French Parliament, it failed by a vote of 264-319 in August 1954, the Treaty itself was an 
important step forward in European unification.272 The European Union of today and NATO 
both carry out some of the functions that were initially envisioned by the EDC Treaty, they just 
avoid some of the supranational military control that the EDC would have provided for. 
According to US historian William Hitchcock, the failure of the EDC was called a “fiasco” at the 
time, but ultimately, it helped bring about new proposals and widen economic integration 
between the Western European countries.273 The “failure” of the EDC ultimately led to a sort of 
wake-up-call to those that believed a political and military union could be developed in Europe 
                                                           
271 Of Aristotle’s three proofs discussed in Rhetoric—ethos, logos and pathos—Eisenhower had a very good ethos or 
character. According to Lynette Hunter, establishing ethos is a “procedure for legitimation and justification of 
political action,” and therefore, Eisenhower’s past experiences (his time in WWII) help secure the idea that he has 
the background and know-how needed to make the claims he did about the unification of Western Europe as 
essential to their security against the Soviets. See “Ideology as the Ethos of the Nation State,” Rhetoric: A Journal of 
the History of Rhetoric, 14 (1996): 201.      
272 James McAllister, 230-244. 
273 William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945-Present 
(New York: Anchor House, 2003). 
  
88 
overnight. 274 The crisis of the EDC Treaty failure in 1954 led to Germany’s entrance into NATO 
in 1955 and the eventual creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.275 
Eisenhower’s push for the EDC during his time as SACEUR helped develop initial acceptance of 
the idea within France and the remaining Western European countries.  
Eisenhower Overlooked 
 The importance of Eisenhower’s rhetoric during his time as SACEUR is not the only 
portion of Eisenhower’s rhetoric that remains untouched by rhetorical critics. On April 2, 1946, 
General Eisenhower gave a speech titled, “Art in Peace and War” at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York.  The speech was meant to commemorate his election as an Honorary Fellow 
for Life by the Trustees. Eisenhower was presented his certificate of fellowship by Mr. Rowland 
Redmond, who noted “Dwight David Eisenhower, soldier, diplomat, and statesman, through 
whose wisdom and foresight many irreplaceable art treasures were saved for future 
generations.”276 In this speech Eisenhower touched on his time as a WWII General, referencing 
his North African campaign. He also developed an interesting dichotomy between art and war 
and the artist and the soldier. Eisenhower’s “Art in Peace and War” speech is another example of 
a piece of Eisenhower’s rhetoric that has been overlooked by historical and rhetorical scholars 
alike during the transitional period between WWII and the beginning of the Cold War. In 
                                                           
274 Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945-2005, Ludger Kuhnhardt, ed. (Berghahn 
Books: 2009): 33. 
275 The EEC was created by the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome; renamed 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union in 2009) of 1957. It gained a common set of institutions along with 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 
under the 1965 Merger Treaty (Treaty of Brussels). With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union 
(Treaty of Maastricht) in 1993, the organization changed its name from the EEC to the European Community (EC) 
and was along with the other aforementioned EC made to comprise the first of the three pillars of the new European 
Union (EU). The entire pillar division, and the EC along with it, was abolished upon the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The legal personality of the EC was at this point transferred to the EU as a whole, a 
change in line with the Lisbon Treaty's wider aim of consolidating the legal nature of the EU. See “The History of 
the European Union,” Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Web. Accessed 24 Sep. 2011. 
<http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm>.  
276 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Art in Peace and War,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, New Series, 4 (1946): 
221-223.  
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particular, this speech sheds light on a role Eisenhower held outside both the military and 
politics. Much like his time as President of Columbia University, this speech could help further 
develop his ability to adapt to his audience and make a persuasive case.  
 Overall, Eisenhower’s role as SACEUR, and his many other roles apart from WWII and 
the presidency, have been overlooked by historians and rhetoricians alike. Eisenhower helped 
revive Western Europe’s will power and made real progress toward helping them take a stand 
against very real threat of the Soviet Union and communism during the early 1950s. 
Eisenhower’s rhetorical efforts taken in particular political contexts help illustrate how he played 
a largely overlooked role in the development of NATO and the eventual formation of the 
European Union we know today. I encourage further analysis of other overlooked rhetoric from 
Eisenhower’s long and intriguing career.  
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6. APPENDIX 
 
Transcripts of Dwight D. Eisenhower SACEUR Speeches: 1951-1951 
From the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission 
 
6.1 Radio Statement Upon Arrival in Paris: January 7, 1951 
 
Greetings to all our neighbors in the Atlantic community - to Europe and the British Isles. I 
return to Europe as a military commander but with no miraculous plans, no display of military 
force. I return with an unshakable faith in Europe - this land of our ancestors - in the underlying 
courage of its people, in their willingness to live and sacrifice for a secure peace and the 
continuance and the progress of civilization. I approach my present task in full awareness that no 
amount of outside aid alone could defend Europe. Moreover, although the North Atlantic Treaty 
nations have now undertaken a great cooperative enterprise for their common security, it is 
obvious that each must still contribute the hard core of its own defense. In the great heritage of 
Europe, in the genius and productivity of its people, must be found the will, the moral strength, 
and much of the means to build defenses behind which its children may prosper and live in 
peace. These are the children of Europe not just of Holland, Italy, France, or other nations. The 
children of all nations deserve better than we have so far been able to promise them. They bear 
no hatred, suspicion or distrust. They have earned none against themselves. Let us work for them 
and put aside all prejudices and past grievances. And let us never shirk from defending their 
birthright of liberty, even as ours has been cherished and staunchly defended for us. I cling to the 
hope that the young lives, the blood and suffering of the last war were not spent as the profligate 
squanders his inheritance - but that from the common ordeal will now rise up a strong and united 
Europe, a Europe that can look forward confidently to a future of peace, advancement and 
mutual security. This is our goal. We must put our hearts and hands to its achievement. No lesser 
purpose, no warped nationalism, and above all, no aggressive or predatory design, should be 
allowed to turn us away from this noble enterprise. In the same degree that we believe danger 
threatens all, we must meet it together. Our task is to preserve the peace, not to incite war.  
We approach that task, not in appeasement, but with the clear eyes and stout hearts of men who 
know that theirs is a righteous cause. There is power in our union - and resourcefulness on sea, 
land and air. Aroused and united, there is nothing which the nations of the Atlantic Community 
cannot achieve. Let those who might be tempted to put this power to the test ponder well the 
lessons of history. The cause of freedom can never be defeated. We are committed to a great 
partnership, and I, in all humility, am proud to serve in one phase of attaining the aspirations of 
our several peoples. Should mankind, through our solidarity, our prayers for peace, and through 
the mercy of God, be spared the catastrophe of another war, then this organization will have 
served a noble purpose. It will have demonstrated that an alliance for peace rather than for war is 
an entirely practical measure - that the power generated in an alliance of such magnitude can 
bring confidence - not fear - to the hearts of men. 
 
6.2 D-Day Commemoration Ceremonies: June 6, 1951 
 
Seven years ago, the land and sea and air forces of the Allied Nations launched the final blow 
against a tyranny entrenched on the European continent. In weapons of war - guns and armor and 
planes - the Allies were to become within months the most formidable military machine of all 
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time. Yet on the sixth of June, 1944, those who landed on Normandy's beaches were few in 
number and weak, measured against the defenses that awaited them. But they were strong in the 
spirit and resolution of the free world. With them rode the hopes of all who loved freedom. 
Behind them, in an ever increasing flood of supply and reinforcement, poured forward the might 
of the West. Ahead of them in every town of France, they were assured a legion of friends whose 
aid and welcome would fortify their arms and hearts. So armed and supported, they could not fall 
short of complete victory. Here in Normandy, it is particularly fitting that we commemorate the 
glory and the sacrifice of the Liberation. For you were eye-witnesses and your towns bear mute 
testimony to the tragic cost that must be paid to regain freedom - once freedom has been lost. 
The young men of the Allied Force who died in the hedgerows, their wounded fellows, those of 
your families and your friends who fell in the war, your ravaged homes and fields - all these are 
the price which we of the West paid. Today, the West is united to defend freedom - before it is 
lost. Never again must there be a campaign of liberation fought on these shores. The integrity of 
all Western Europe must be defended against predatory force. In this endeavor, we seek only 
peace. But we know - out of tragic experience - that peace can never be the portion of the 
divided, the fearful, or of those who would stand aside, in the vain hope that the hordes of 
tyranny might overlook them. We shall be strong only as we are one. And we look to the future 
knowing that the strength of the free nations can be built into an invincible barrier against 
aggression. The free world is strong - spiritually, economically, and materially. It has vast 
resources, technical skill, and productivity. Given the single ingredient of unity - unity in 
determination, in purpose and in readiness to sacrifice - there is nothing it cannot accomplish. 
Those who seek the enslavement of men strive by every means to set one against the other. They 
attempt, in every free land, to sow discord and dissention, turning neighbor against neighbor, 
fomenting class warfare that farmer and factory worker and manager alike may more easily be 
oppressed. Within the community of nations, they use every device of propaganda to separate us 
so that one by one we may be more easily incorporated into the regimented world. They shall not 
succeed. We know that we want only a peace among nations that will permit all men - of East 
and West alike - to live decent and productive lives. The rulers of the Communistic world say 
that their purpose is the same. But how can we believe those who talk of liberty when they 
permit no liberty at home; who promise benefits to the workers although millions labor in their 
slave camps; who speak of peasant problems with mock sympathy after wrenching from the 
peasants at home their land and produce? How can we believe those who talk of peace while 
they support aggression in the Orient and arm Eastern Germany in the face of no conceivable 
threat? The free world's partnership for peace will endure because its high purpose is to assure - 
for ourselves and for all who in good faith join with us - the freedom demanded by the dignity of 
man. Freedom is not won and forever possessed - it must be re-earned every day in every 
generation. The men who lie in the cemeteries of Normandy died that we, each day of our lives, 
might prove ourselves worthy of their sacrifice for freedom. We shall meet the test of our day in 
the spirit of those whose heroism we here commemorate. We will give our best - even as they, 
who here gave their all. 
 
6.3 Talk to SHAPE Staff: June 14, 1951 
 
My reason for asking you to come here, ladies and gentlemen, is a very simple one. Since the last 
time I tried to see all the members of SHAPE - sometime I think in the middle of February - it 
seems that we've grown considerably. When I expressed a desire to meet every member of our 
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little Astoria community, I was informed we had no room big enough to hold them all at once. It 
was a bit alarming and shocking to me because we have been bragging about the small size of 
our headquarters. Now, I realize that when you are split up among a very great number of 
sections that you get down to numbers that are not large and that many of you feel overworked. 
But let us remember that we are working in the service of nations which are trying to do a job 
important to civilization. In fact, it's successful performance is vital to the civilization we know 
and it makes no difference from what country we come. Failure of the project might be felt more 
quickly in a forward country than it would in America. But it would be felt in America no less 
firmly and no less conclusively when the full effects finally reached there. Knowing as we do 
that the defense effort is straining our economic and financial resources t the utmost, it is up to us 
to give example of austerity so far as we can. To substitute quality for quantity, to do a little bit 
more than is expected of us, to be an example everywhere, to be an example in front of the 
citizenry of this city, in our own countries when we go home, to be showing every minute that 
we believe wholeheartedly in the conviction that the free world must work together and well or 
there is going to be no free world. So the effort to keep down our size is not merely one of not 
being able to stand criticism - it is because I believe we should be an example of economy and 
efficiency. In that connection, I hope you won't mind my saying that the staff work that has come 
from this headquarters is superior to any that I have had in the past, indicating to me that 
possibly small staffs are just a bit more efficient. Maybe we don't make quite so much work for 
each other and don't need so many assistants to answer our comrade across the hall. Now, on the 
more personal side, I have a favor to ask of you. When I see you in our hotel accommodations 
here, or anywhere else, on the sidewalk, or in the building, I am delighted naturally to have your 
greetings. I would feel very disappointed - I would feel that I was something of a failure if there 
was anyone here who would rather pass me in silence and not recognize me than to say 
something on the form of good morning or hello. But I do beg of you on the steps and around the 
halls of this building, please don't turn aside and stand at attention. It sort of worries me that I 
ought to stand there also, and if we both started to, I don't know when either of us will get to 
work. If that's a custom in your country I would be very appreciative if you would let it go in this 
international place, because there must definitely be a family feeling among us if we are to be 
successful. We have to be great friends, we have to be convinced, so convinced that each of us is 
indispensable to this great cause and therefore we are quite busy. We have time to greet a partner 
but we haven't time to stand around too long in some mistaken idea of formality. I assure you 
that I don't want to stand in the way of your ability to do your work and get home at the proper 
time instead of staying here until dark. Now maybe I seem to be violating my own advice by 
asking you to come here. But at least I can do this - first, I can give myself the opportunity of 
seeing you collectively and possibly may be able to identify you in the future, or I can make sure 
of this: that each of you will know which particular bald-headed, round-faced man it is that you 
are greeting when you happen to run into your commander. I can't conceive of any more 
important job that any of you could be doing in your particular sphere, in your particular 
capacity, in your particular rank than you are doing here today. If I didn't believe this, I certainly 
wouldn't be here and I am quite sure that none of you would. Now, because I do look upon you 
as a selected group of highly qualified people, because all of our countries also look on you in 
the same way, I call again attention to our responsibility for leadership and good example. I am 
quite certain no other body could meet that test more successfully. Since the day when I was as 
young as some of you here and joined the Army as a 2nd Lt., I have had one little practice which 
I persist in keeping until the end of my days. It is this: there is no one in my organization who 
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doesn't have the right to come to see me if he feels that his problem is not properly dealt with by 
his own immediate superior and the chain of superiors between him and me. If he has a personal 
problem that he believes is ignored or not properly handled, if he believes he has an idea with 
respect to this organization, that is so important that he cannot take no for an answer, he is 
perfectly justified in coming all the way up. Anybody who gets in your way would be removed. 
But they won't get in your way, because that is the kind of burning conviction we are looking for. 
Even if in my great wisdom I decide you are wrong, I can still admire that kind of determination 
and that kind of courage. In the meantime, good luck and thank you again for the time you have 
given me to say ‘hello.’ 
 
6.4 English Speaking Union Dinner, London: July 3, 1951 
 
One hundred seventy-five years ago, the founding fathers of the American Republic declared 
their independence of the British crown, Little could they have known – in the heat and 
bitterness of the hour – that the severance, accomplished in passion, would through the years 
flower into an alliance of such fitness and worth that it was never recorded on legal parchment, 
but in the hearts of our two peoples. The bond that joins us – stronger than blood lines, than 
common tongue and common law – is the fundamental conviction that man was created to be 
free, that he can be trusted with freedom, that governance have as a primary function the 
protection of his freedom. In the scale of values of the English-speaking people, freedom is the 
first and most precious right. Without it, no other right can be exercised, and human existence 
loses all significance. This unity of ours in fundamentals is an international fact. Yet on more 
than one occasion, it has been obscured in Britain and in my own country by concern with trifles 
and small disputes, fanned into the flames of senseless antagonisms. Serious differences in 
convictions must be beaten out on the anvil of logic and justice. But scarcely need they be 
dragged into the public forum, in the petty hope of capturing a fleeting local acclaim, at the 
expense of an absent partner. There are men in this room with whom, in World War II, I had 
arguments, hotly sustained and of long duration. Had all these been headlined in the press of our 
two countries, they could have created public bitterness, confusing our peoples in the midst of 
our joint effort. Decisions were reached without such calamitous results, because those at odds 
did not find it necessary to seek justification for their personal views in a public hue and cry. 
Incidentally, a more personal reason for this expression of satisfaction is a later conclusion that 
my own position in the arguments was not always right. In any case, may we never forget that 
our common devotion to deep human values and our mutual trust are the bedrock of our joint 
strength. In that spirit our countries are joined with the peoples of Western Europe and the North 
Atlantic to defend the freedom of western civilization. Opposed to us – cold and forbidding – is 
an ideological front that marshals every weapon in the arsenal of dictatorship. Subversion, 
propaganda, deceit and the threat of naked force are daily hurled against us and our friends in a 
globe-encircling, relentless campaign. We earnestly hope that the call for a truce in Korea marks 
a change in attitude. If such a welcome development does occur, the brave men of the United 
Nations forces did much to bring it about. We entered the conflict one year ago, resolved that 
aggression against free and friendly South Korea would not be tolerated. Certain of the nation’s 
furnishing forces had heavy demands elsewhere, including postwar reconstruction at home. 
Nevertheless, every contingent added evidence of the solidarity and firmness of the free nations 
in giving an object lesson to aggression. Our success in this difficult and distant operation 
reflects the fortitude of the Allied troops and the leadership that guided them. The stand in Korea 
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should serve notice in this area, as well as in the Far East, that we will resist aggression. Our 
effort to provide security against the possibility of another and even greater emergency – an 
emergency which will never be of our making – must go forward with the same resolution and 
courage that has characterized our Korean forces. The member nations in the north Atlantic 
Treaty Organization need not fear any future or nay Communistic threat if we are alert, realistic 
and resolute. Our community possesses a potential might that far surpasses the sinister forces of 
slave camps and chained millions. But to achieve the serenity and confidence that our potential 
can provide, we must press forward with the mobilization of our spiritual and intellectual 
strengths, we must develop promptly the material force that will assure the safety of our friends 
upon the continent and the security of the free world. This is the challenge of our times that, until 
satisfactorily met, establishes priorities in all our thoughts, our work, our sacrifice. The hand of 
the aggressor is stayed by strength – and strength alone. Although the security of each of us is 
bound up in the safety of all of us, the immediate threat is most keenly felt in Europe. Half the 
continent is already within the monolithic mass of totalitarianism. The drawn and haunted faces 
in the docks of the purge courts are grim evidence of what Communistic domination means. It is 
clearly necessary that we quickly develop maximum strength within free Europe itself. Our own 
interests demand it. It is a truism that where, among partners, strength is demanded in its fullness 
unity is the first requisite. Without unity, the effect becomes less powerful in application, less 
decisive in result. This fact has special application in Europe. It would be difficult indeed to 
overstate the benefits, in those years of stress and tension that would accrue to NATO if the free 
nations of Europe were truly a unit. But it is in that vital region, history, custom, language and 
prejudice have combined to hamper integration. Progress has been hobbled by a web of customs 
barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral cartels, local shortages, and economic 
monstrosities. How tragic! Free men, facing the specter of political bondage, are crippled by 
artificial bonds that they themselves have forged, and they alone can loosen! Here is a task to 
challenge the efforts of the wisest statesman, the best economists, the most brilliant diplomats. 
European leaders, seeking a sound and wise solution, are spurred by the vision of a man at this 
table – a man of inspiring courage in dark hours, of wise counsel in grave decisions. Winston 
Churchill’s plea for a united Europe can yet bear such greatness of fruit that it may well be 
remembered as the most notable achievement of a career marked by achievement. The 
difficulties of integrating Western Europe of course appear staggering to those who live by ritual. 
But great majorities in Europe earnestly want liberty, peace and the opportunity to pass on to 
their children the fair lands and the culture of Western Europe. They deserve, at the very least, a 
fair chance to work together for the common purpose; freed of the costly encumbrances they are 
now compelled to carry. Europe cannot attain the towering material stature possible to its 
peoples’ skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork fences. They foster localized 
instead of common interest. They pyramid every cost with middlemen, tariffs, taxes, and 
overheads. Barred, absolutely, are the efficient division of labor and resources and the easy flow 
of free trade. In the political field, these barriers promote distrust and suspicion. They serve 
vested interests at the expense of peoples and prevent truly concerted action for Europe’s own 
obvious good. This is not to say that, as a commander, I have found anything but ready 
cooperation among the Governments of Western Europe. Time and again, I have saluted from 
my heart the spirit of their armed services – of officers and men alike – from the mountains of 
Italy to the fjords of Norway, from Normandy to the Curtain. Within political circles, I have 
found statesmen eager to assure the success of their current defense programs. I have no doubts 
as to the capacity of NATO to surmount even the formidable obstacles imposed upon us by the 
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political facts of present day Europe. Yet with the handicaps of enforced division, it is clear that 
even the minimum essential security effort will seriously strain the resources of Europe. We 
ignore this danger at our peril since the effects of economic failure would be disastrous upon the 
spiritual and material strength alike. True security never rests upon the shoulders of men denied a 
decent present and the hope of a better future. But with unity achieved, Europe could build 
adequate security and, at the same time, continue the march of human betterment that has 
characterized western civilization. Once united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, 
the foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, the skilled labor of Italy, 
will produce miracles for the common good. In such unity is a secure future for these peoples. It 
would mean early independence of aid from America and other Atlantic countries. The coffers, 
mines and factories of that continent are not inexhaustible. Dependence upon must be minimized 
by the maximum cooperative effort. The establishment a workable European federation would 
go far to create confidence among people everywhere that Europe was doing its full and vital 
share in giving this cooperation. Any soldier contemplating this problem would be moved to 
express the opinion that it cannot be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct 
and decisive assault, with all available means. The project faces the deadly danger of 
procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages. Granted that the bars of tradition 
and habit are numerous and stout, the greatest bar to this or any human enterprise, lie in the 
minds of men themselves. The negative is always the easy side, since it holds that nothing should 
be done. The negative is happy in lethargy, contemplating almost with complacent satisfaction, 
the difficulties of any other course. But difficulties are often of such slight substance that they 
fade into nothing at the first sign of success. If obstacles are of greater consequence, they can 
always be overcome when they must be overcome. And which of these obstacles could be so 
important to as peace, security and prosperity for Europe’s populations? Could we not help? We 
the people of the British Commonwealth and of the United States have profited by unity at home. 
If, with our moral and material assistance, the free European nations could attain a similar 
integration, our friends could be strengthened, our own economies improved and the laborious 
NATO machinery of mutual defense vastly simplified. A solid, healthy, confident Europe would 
be the greatest possible boon to the functioning of the Atlantic Pact. But granting that we cannot 
reach maximum security without a united Europe, let us by no means neglect what is within our 
immediate grasp or depreciate the achievements already attained. Look back, I ask you, over a 
space of two years only. Consider the dangerous level to which morale and defensive defense 
had descended; the despairing counsel of neutralism, appeasement and defeatism that then 
existed. Against such a backdrop, the accomplishments of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization are magnificent; manifest. We are joined together in purpose and growing 
determination; we know the danger, we have defined our goals. Each day we make headway. 
The basic economies of European nations are on the upswing; the chaos and floundering of the 
postwar years are definitely behind. The international forces of the Atlantic defense are no longer 
merely figures on paper; the international organization is no longer a headquarters without 
troops. The forces – ground, naval and air – are assembling. They are training together and the 
spirit of mutual respect and cooperation that marks their joint maneuvers is hearting and 
encouraging. Still far too few in numbers and short of equipment, their ranks are filling; 
machines and weapons reach them in steady stream. The military and political leaders of the 
participating nations no longer slowly feel their way forward in an endeavor without guiding 
precedent. Caution that is inescapable in a new and unique enterprise has been replaced by 
confidence born out of obstacles overcome. The Allied Powers in Europe are constituting a team 
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for defense; one capable of assuring a lasting and secure peace. The winning of freedom is not to 
be compared to the winning of a game – with the victory recorded forever in history. Freedom 
has its life in the heart, the actions, the spirit of men and so it must be duly earned and refreshed 
– else like a flower cut from its life-giving roots, it will wither and die. All of us have pledged 
our word, one to the other that this shall never be. We have cut the pattern for our effort – we are 
devoting to it available resources for its realization. We fight not only our own battle – we are 
defending for all mankind those things that allow personal dignity to the least of us – those 
things that permit each to believe himself important in the eyes of God. We are preserving 
opportunity for men to lift up their hearts and minds to the highest places – there must be no 
stragglers in such a conflict. The road ahead may be long – it is certain to be marked by critical 
and difficult passages. But if we march together, endure together, share together, we shall 
succeed – we shall gloriously succeed together! 
 
6.5 Remarks at the Official Opening of SHAPE Headquarters at Marly: July 23, 1951 
 
Mr. President, on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations, I thank you, your Minister of 
Defense, Mr. Moch, other governmental officials of France and all your people for providing this 
Headquarters for the Allied Forces in Europe. Our special thanks to you, Sir, because of your 
unfailing personal cooperation and assistance, particularly in making available this beautiful spot 
in the Forest of Marly, for this Headquarters. In all history this is the first time that an Allied 
Headquarters has been set up in peace to preserve the peace, and not to wage war. It is our prayer 
that with high courage, and with the support of our people, and the grace of God, we shall not 
fail in this purpose. We strive to lift from the hearts of men the fear of the cell block and the 
slave camp. We strive to establish a 'Pax Atlantica' under which all men may push forward to 
new heights, to new levels of achievement. In a secure peace attained through strength is now the 
safety and security of the free nations. And now, Mr. President, I declare the Headquarters to be 
officially opened. 
 
6.6 Talk to French Statesman at SHAPE Briefing: November 19, 1951 
 
Gentlemen, it is a very great honor to speak to this distinguished group about the affairs of 
SHAPE. As a matter of fact, it is more than honor. There is a certain, deep responsibility 
involved for me, because you gentlemen are inescapably part of the high command that must 
direct the fortunes of the Free World. The decisions which you must make as members of one of 
the parliaments of one of the NATO countries are so grave, so significant for the future of all of 
us that we can afford nothing less than the full truth. We must have the full truth, all the facts, 
that we can bring to bear upon these complicated questions. So, it is in an effort to clarify for 
you, or to present before you, a picture of some of those things in which we here in SHAPE are 
involved, that I address you this morning. Now, I'm quite certain that General Carpentier has 
taken you through a series of statistics, factual information, and considerations of the kind 
applying to our problem, to the point that you probably do not expect of me any further delving 
into detail of that kind. I shall do my best to stick to principle, to basic truth, as we see it; and 
then, if there is any question you should like to ask me, I shall attempt to answer it. The 
phenomenon of our time that has disarranged the lives and aspirations and purposes of all of us is 
that a very powerful dictatorship existing in the world has announced, in time of peace, that it 
cannot live amicably with another form of government in the world. In other words, we not only 
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have the evidence of unsuccessful conferences concerning specific matters to show us that the 
Iron Curtain countries have no intention of trying to accommodate themselves to any of our 
purposes or desires - we have their own announced words. In the face of that, the free countries, 
or a group of free countries, decided that we must match the unity that dictatorships achieve with 
a dagger in the back and with secret police, we must match that unity with the kind of unity that 
free men can develop among equal partners. Now our first great world war President, Woodrow 
Wilson, stated that idea; that the highest form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation of a 
free people. That is, of course, a statement of high principle; but it's a truth that has as much 
application to the affairs of one nation as it does to another nation. In the gross, or aggregate 
amount of resources that the Free World has, as compared to the gross or aggregate resources 
available to the Iron Curtain countries, we are in very good shape indeed. Our productivity; our 
levels of education; the genius of our scientists; the accessibility we have to the raw materials of 
the world; the speed with which we can convert them to our own needs. In all these things we are 
far superior to the Soviets. The one thing they have is this unity. That is the one place where we 
must achieve equality; in my view, superiority. Now that unity does not apply merely to the 
command of some units in the field already produced by the several countries. Indeed, I 
sometimes thing that the sheer, or mere military functions or phase of this problem is the 
simplest. Let us first take a look at the composition of a nation's power - and I mean power in the 
sense that it can exert influence in the field of force. It is first made up of the spirit of man. All 
human progress has its source in man's heart, his spirit. It is made up of his understanding; the 
products of his brain. It is made up very, very largely of the productivity of his economy; its 
ability to support whatever purely military force must be placed in the field. Without the 
capability of an economy to support military force, whatever military force we have is worse 
than useless; because it's a drain upon the national economy that in the moment of crisis will 
disappear and be of no use, because there is nothing behind it. The soldier of today, the soldiers 
in this headquarters The soldier of today, the soldiers in this headquarters, must study every day, 
as they try to make up the composition of their recommendations: Where is that balance of 
power between an economy and an actual force in being or in reserve that makes the greatest 
sum total of strength we can produce? Now here is where it comes in again - the spirit of man: 
That sum total of the economic and military power is not necessarily fixed by the number of 
men, the amount of money, and the number of factories that we have. Human beings themselves 
make the variation. If we are dedicated to a purpose, if we fervently support of belief in the 
dignity and freedom of man, we'll do more than if we say this is just another chore that we must 
perform because it's to our advantage to do so. How much do we believe it? I would not be bold 
enough to recall to you some of the glories of your own history. But I could put my question in 
this way: Are all of us in this thing, in 12 nations, are we ready to attempt to measure up to the 
spirit that the French showed in Verdun in 1916? Now, gentlemen, if we can do that there is no 
question about the answer that we are going to achieve. Now the methods towards which we 
proceed toward those answers are not simple, because we do have gaps in our economy caused 
by war's destruction; by discouragement; by the loss of men in your own country - loss of men 
that reaches back even into World War I, and the absence almost - at least, a great part, of a 
generation – we have all sorts of factors which make this problem very difficult to solve. The 
point is, if we are so united in our devotion to freedom, in 12 countries, we are not going to allow 
any particular difficulty in one to overcome us, because we go back again to our belief in united 
strength. And if we do our best, we can see our way over any obstacle, any difficulty, that may 
impede our progress toward this goal of a peaceful security. Remember, that's all the Free World 
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asks. We don't ask for the power; we don't want the power, that would tempt us into military 
adventure. We want a peaceful security so that, behind this wall the productivity of man's hands 
and hearts and brain can be devoted to the betterment of humans. In the long run, unless our 
system provides to the men and women who live under it a better living; betterment in his 
opportunity to achieve spiritual goals; better in its opportunity to provide material advantages, 
for themselves and their children, then we will fail. Now our system is a better one, and this is 
one of the strongest elements in our whole armament. The Soviets themselves say ours is better, 
else why do they have to destroy ours in order to live themselves? It is the weakness of their own 
system that compels them to take an aggressive attitude toward us. Free people are perfectly 
willing to say: 'Why, we don't mind if Russia wants to live that way. Let them go.’ But they have 
to say that, “If that free system continues, we'll go down.” In the long run, the appeal of the free 
system to the hearts and minds of men is the crisis of this whole thing. Now, I wonder whether 
you would allow me to come just a little bit closer to the affairs of the staffs as we plod along, 
day by day. We have the job of taking what the Governments give us, organizing it, commanding 
it, arranging it, so that it can be most effective: first, in giving confidence to our own people; 
secondly, in order to meet the test of war if it is thrust upon us. The first point I should like to 
make is a factor concerning this command business that is too often overlooked. As I see it, in an 
allied command, particularly one of such vast scope as are the NATO commands, the first thing 
that a nation should think about, if offered the post of command in any place, is not prestige; not 
any flower in the crown the nation will wear, but rather the terrific national responsibility picked 
up when it assumes that command. I do not mind telling you that the one question I asked my 
own Government when they told me to come over here in response to the NATO Council, to 
command, this last winter. I said, 'Have you carefully considered the responsibility that the 
nation is picking up in the eyes of the world when you ask an American to go to Europe?? Now 
the mere fact that they did shows that there has been a very great deal of leadership exercised in 
my country; to get people to accept, at least in promise, the great burdens and responsibilities 
that go with such a place; the responsibilities to supply munitions; pay the taxes; to help - in 
short, to be a true partner in such an enterprise, each giving according to his capacities; and only 
each nation even capable of determining what their capacity is. I can no more tell you what the 
capacity of France is than you could try to interpret for me the feeling of Abilene, Kansas, a little 
town in the center of the United States where I was raised. So, in this command business, we 
here at SHAPE constantly emphasize the responsibility that a nation picks up when it is helping, 
through its own nationals, to direct the affairs of any particular group. I should like to make that 
point very earnestly and very strongly, because in the long run it cannot be escaped. Now, I have 
touched upon a point just now of the leadership that was involved in America to get an 
acceptance of this kind of responsibility. We talk often of the morale of men; and there is no 
question about the terrific importance of morale in any struggle of this kind. We too often, I 
think, talk about the development of morale through sophisticated measures and ideas. We speak 
of the pocket book as the most sensitive nerve in the body. We talk about a full stomach being 
necessary to morale, as if hungry men had never fought and fought well. What I'm getting at is 
this: There is a direct, as well as a material approach to the heart of man. There is needed now, as 
probably more than anywhere else, leadership in our populations, to explain to them, first, the 
essentials of this task. That it is freedom against slavery; that is, liberty against regimentation. 
We must all understand it. We must understand how we are attempting to combine together, to 
get the strength that is inherent in unity. We must make our people understand that unless each 
does his best, then there is no safety for anybody. That it is enlightened self-interest that is the 
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keynote to our cling together. The enlightened self-interest of France must be served in NATO, 
or you will never stay with NATO long. It must be the very same in my country. The enlightened 
self-interest of each single one of these 12 nations must be served by this clinging together, or it 
will never cling together. If it does not cling together, we'll fall victim to the kind of thing that 
one of my country's early statesmen, who made much of his early reputation here in your 
country, referred to when he said, 'We must all hang together, or we will assuredly each hang 
separately.’ Now, that's reducing it to a very low order of appeal. But, gentlemen, the solution to 
NATO's problems lies in the hearts and minds of the millions of people that make up the 
population of the United States and Britain and all the other North Atlantic Nations to include, of 
course, at the very foundation of the European complex, this one. I want to mention, specifically, 
another subject in which I know each of you take a very great interest. It is the need for the 
strength of Western Germany in our coalition. Now we can, without Germany, produce, although 
at some excessive cost. I think - but we can produce a position of military stalemate in the areas 
where we not exist - where France lives, where Italy lives, where Belgium lives, and so on. But 
that is not good enough. You aren't going to have the security, the confidence, that comes with 
some depth in your defense; some greater power in your defense; the serenity and confidence 
that will allow you to turn more and more of your productivity to the betterment of men instead 
of the production of useless, sterile and negative formations that we call armies, navies and air 
forces. You can't do that unless you get this strength of Western Germany into the whole 
complex. Now, gentlemen, if there were any one of several courses that would apply to this 
problem, it might be one for study. But we know that that center of Europe is not going to remain 
a vacuum. It is not going to remain completely outside of this ideological struggle of freedom on 
the one hand and regimentation on the other. We must absorb the major part of the European 
strength, of that German strength or it would assuredly go the other way. There is no one in this 
headquarters; there is no one in any of the NATO organizations to whom I have spoken who 
does not clearly realize, and sympathize with, the justifiable apprehension in this corner of the 
world if we should allow Germany, undeterred, and too independently, to achieve a military 
force and powers that would begin to let them resort to the military adventures of the kind that 
they have so often before undertaken. We must not even let them get into a blackmailing 
position. Now the job of leadership today, in the NATO, with respect to this one, is how to solve 
that problem. I've heard many soldiers stand up and give you the sophisticated, obvious, material 
answers about a force that would be made up of a conglomerate of nations. With respect to that, I 
don't think that merely because the materialistic view considers a problem to be impossible, we 
should necessarily shrink from it. It was probably impossible to bring off the great military feat 
that you people did in the late 18th Century when, alone, because of your resolution you had to 
stand against the might of Europe. And you not only defended your own, but you drove them 
back. That is the kind of thing that must be done again. Now, all the way up and down the line 
here, I believe that we've got perfectly good, sound answers, if we can have confidence in our 
partners; if each of us determines this: “I shall do my best.” And I mean, when I say I, I mean a 
nation; this nation will do its best: whether its mine at home, yours here, Belgium, Denmark, it 
makes no difference. Each must do its best; and it alone can be the judge of the sights it will set 
for itself. Frankly, my tendency probably would be to set your sights too low. My belief is that 
you would do more in the goals I would give to you. Now, on the other hand, in setting those 
goals, I do not place this same pressure on the time element that some others do. If you're going 
to buy an insurance policy for your wife, you say 'Well, I'd better buy it today, because you 
might die tomorrow, as well as two years from now.’ In that sense, this problem is always 
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urgent. If we need security, let's get it now. But there is no man alive who can tell you that you 
have a point of critical danger in June 1953, June 1954, or any other time. The sole criterion is 
this: How fast may we go in the attainment of our own goals set in conformity with our own 
legitimate aspirations? Now that is the only time schedule that I can see applies to this thing. 
Because, if you are out in the Bay swimming for your life, you don't say, “I must reach the land 
by evening, or I won't reach it.” You'll say, “I bloody well have got to reach the land.” That's 
what you say, and that's what we say now. Now, I assure you, I've been accused of being an 
incurable optimist; and I want to make one remark about that - I've even been called naive, I'm so 
optimistic. When we have determined, gentlemen, that a job must be done; that there's no 
acceptable alternative - may I ask you, what is the use of pulling a long face about it? Did any of 
the people that you remember as leaders in history - did they achieve what they had to do by 
weeping in front of their followers? By pulling a long face? Why don't we go at this thing, each 
of us, each in his own way, as a free citizen of a free country, and say, “Come what may, it will 
be done”? Now if you do that you're bound to put on your face a look that the world will call 
optimistic. Because you're not to be defeated by a low order of obstacle; by the material impasses 
that people bring up to prove that we cannot do it. I'm going to finish this morning by quoting a 
little verse I quoted down at the school, so at least one member here has heard it before: There is, 
in the words of the Prince of Peace, a very, very wise observation. It is recorded in the Bible in 
the Book of Saint Luke, and reads this way: “When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace, his 
goods are in peace.” Gentlemen, that's all we have to do. Thank you very much. You might tell 
them that during the course of the luncheon, which is going to be very informal, in our room up 
there, that I could maybe get around and speak to any of them who has a personal question. All 
right, thank you very much. 
 
6.7 NATO Council: November 27, 1951 
 
I shall start by making brief comments on the two presentations you have heard this afternoon, 
one by my Chief of Staff, the other by Mr. Harriman and Sir Edwin Plowden. With respect to the 
report rendered to you by the Temporary Council Committee, my observation is that in their 
work can be found some measure of the progress of NATO. Twelve sovereign nations have met 
together, through the medium of this committee, and each has there tabled its military programs, 
its capacity for supporting military programs, its readiness to support a great idea in common 
security. This has been done freely, willingly, without any thought of being subjected to the 
processes of the inquisition. Far from it - no one has even thought of this work except in the form 
of a cooperative, beneficial effort. I submit that if we could get the Soviets to agree, with other 
nations, to even a partial mutual examination of this kind, there would probably be no necessity 
for us to be working at the particular jobs in which we are now engaged. This investigation also 
gives evidence to me of a growing capacity on the part of the NATO machinery to take specific 
decisions in specific instances, to reach results so that we can get ahead - so that we can get away 
from mere statements of principle and great hopes and translate these things into the field of 
concrete action. The presentation by my Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, gives you some idea 
of the work that is going on in your SHAPE Headquarters. There, each of our NATO countries 
has provided accomplished staff officers. They form a unique group: they have no patronage to 
spread around; they do not make promotions; they cannot increase pay; but they can work - 
possibly because they are relieved from these routine and customary concerns and 
preoccupations of normal staff. They can give their entire attention to the real mission that this 
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Council has set before them, and I assure you that that staff works around the clock, with one 
idea only, the preservation of the peace through the production of a collective strength. It is 
zealous; it is efficient. I appear before you as the leader of the European Command of these 
twelve nations. You are responsible for issuing instructions to me and other commanders. You 
are responsible for the major decisions. You can make wise decisions only if you possess the 
facts, and only if you know the true feelings which animate your subordinates. Our reports to 
you, therefore, must cover everything in which you might possibly have a responsibility with 
respect to us, if you are to continue to function in such fashion that the machinery of NATO will 
be truly effective. It seems scarcely necessary to observe that I have never sought the role of 
philosopher; most certainly I have never had any reputation as such. But I submit that any man 
would be completely insensible to the influence of History if he could tread the streets of this 
city and not feel that he was living in the very midst of the recorded history of our civilization. 
Reaching far back beyond the beginning of our own era, there is fixed in majestic stone the 
record of almost every century of man's accomplishments. In this eternal city we are meeting for 
a brief moment only, but fifty years from now there will probably be some concern as to what we 
have done in the organization that you gentlemen direct, and in which my staff and I labor. It 
seems appropriate to consider, however briefly, how history will look at us; for we cannot escape 
the consequences of our own words and acts. I believe that if we, now, allow the influence of 
traditionalism, cautious approach, calculations as to what is politically feasible, and if we are 
burdened too much by all other deterrent influences that affect men - if we allow these influences 
to keep us from positive and direct action, there will be nothing in history about us and the 
organization we represent. We will be nothing more than a feeble ripple, washed away and 
forgotten. But if the problems that you men have taken upon your shoulders are met with 
courage and fortitude and confidence; if each in his own niche, can perform the task of 
leadership that have fallen to his lot to perform, then there will be no monument in history 
capable really of typifying the grandeur of your accomplishment. For you are not trying to lead 
any captives in chains down the streets of any NATO city. You are seeking no triumph, except 
the triumph of giving free men the right and opportunity to live as they desire. On the shield that 
each SHAPE man wears appears the motto, 'Vigilance is the price of liberty.’ There is another 
text that we observe in SHAPE. It is a text spoken by the Prince of Peace. It runs, 'When a strong 
man, armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace.’ In our case the man is twelve nations. 
The strength of these nations is a great combination of moral force, integrity of individuals and 
nations, the scientific and intellectual achievements of our peoples. It includes our capacity for 
producing arms, for using them effectively and efficiently, if such becomes necessary. The goods 
of the men of whom we speak comprise many things, but certainly they are not merely property. 
They are not merely rights or even the lives of nations and individuals. The most precious item 
among them is a way of life; a way of life that has been won for us through boundless sacrifice 
and can be preserved in each generation only by further sacrifices from its adherents. Because, 
therefore, we are defending a way of life, we must be respectful of that way of life as we proceed 
to the solution of our problem. We must not violate its principles and its precepts, and we must 
not destroy from within what we are trying to defend from without. The economic fabric of a 
nation is a part of its way of life; possibly you can make a case for saying the economy is more 
valuable than the arms it has produced, because, without economic support, any amount of arms 
is futile in the emergency of war. We are now engaged in producing the military portion of the 
strong man's strength, so that he may be sufficiently armed to allow his goods to remain in peace. 
We are producing, forging, and sharpening the instruments that we require. There has been much 
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talk of ‘52 goals, ‘53 goals, ‘54 goals, and so on, and I must say to you gentlemen that inflexible 
dates leave me cold. While such figures and dates are necessary for purposes of planning and 
putting appropriate sums in the national budgets in order to obtain what we need, our real 
objective is to gain for our people at the earliest possible moment the tranquility of mind, the 
peaceful and confident security to which they are entitled. In that sense there is no time to waste. 
Why should we sit here and wonder whether or not we are going to be attacked? We are free 
people. We know our rights. We know our strength, so ably stated a few moments ago by Mr. 
Harriman and Sir Edwin Plowden. In direct comparison with the dictatorship that has announced 
its implacable hostility to our way of life, there is only one thing in which we are inferior. This is 
the unity, in his case achieved by pistol in the back. Free men don't have to use such methods. 
But we must, each of us, see that the enlightened self-interest of each of our countries is served 
by the progress we make in producing collective security. It is stated in one of the founding 
documents in my own country that governments are established among men for certain purposes, 
one of which is to provide for the common security. We have come to realize that in the face of 
powerful, ruthless threats posed by dictatorship, there is no longer a possibility that any one 
nation may by itself produce the necessary security for its own people. Thus, whether we like it 
or not, our ancient idea of sovereignty has been impinged upon and modified by world 
conditions. But this does not mean that the cure is necessarily in conceding sovereignty to any 
group or supra-national structure, but certainly it does indicate a pooling of a portion of our 
sovereignty, and by pooling, regain the strength to perform for each of us one of the functions for 
which each government was set up. So, I say, as we proceed toward this goal, let us not delude 
ourselves with repetitions of dates and years, be it ‘53, ‘54, or any other. The target is there. It is 
something of a reasonable nature, but changing daily with new scientific appliances that come up 
to the battlefield. Every kind of influence that affects warfare will affect our problem and our list 
of requirements. So let us by no means delay objectives that should be obtained now. Neither 
should we, on the other hand, so badly coordinate our military progress with economic capacity 
that we destroy both. This describes, partially, the problem for which you have set up the TCC. 
And I submit again that if our hearts, if our determination, if our qualities of leadership are equal 
to the task, then the economic limitations will not be nearly so rigid as we may first judge them 
to be. Morale can help here. In these modern and sophisticated times, we have come to think of 
morale as something that you purchase materially. We seem to believe that morale and 
confidence and courage are produced by a full stomach, warm clothing, and a roof over the head 
- by a standard of living. A reasonable and endurable status in this regard is, of course, necessary 
to life itself; but true morale is likewise produced by direct appeal to the heart of man. Let us 
make no mistake about it. Now, I am going to talk a little bit about a favorite subject of mine. It 
is also a favorite subject of several of my friends at this table; in fact, of practically everyone to 
whom I have talked in Europe. It is the idea of European unity! The advantages to be gained by 
us through unification of Europe are so great that I have never found anyone to quarrel with the 
abstraction, the statement of the principle. But I should like to have it distinctly understood that 
when I talk about advantages to be gained by a complete unity that may not be immediately 
within our grasp. I am not setting up any alibi for anyone failing to do his best today! We must 
continue, urgently, to march forward with what we have, and make the best of it. On the battle 
field, when the bullets are flying, no soldier waits for tractor to bring up a ditch-digging machine 
to get him a bit of shelter from those bullets. He gets ahold of an entrenching tool, or even his 
bayonet, and he scratches gravel; he digs into the mud, into the rocks or anything else, so as to 
get his body protected. Now, we have so long neglected our common defenses and our military 
  
112 
developments that we are, in a way, in the position of that soldier on a battlefield. So let's grab an 
entrenching tool! I do not need to recite to such a body as this the great advantages that would 
come to us through unification of Western Europe, unification in its economy, its military 
systems, finally its political organisms. Under such conditions we would no longer have the job 
of trying to determine what each nation would have; we would have Mr. Monnet's true concept 
of a single balanced force for the whole. No nation would have to keep, for prestige purposes 
alone, particular units, officers, organizations, or services. All this you can easily comprehend. 
But even as we long for such a great advance, I assure you that under the programs now in hand 
we can, in Western Europe, erect a defense that can at least, although expensively and uneasily, 
produce a stalemate. But that is not good enough. As my Chief of Staff pointed out to you, we 
need depth to our defensive position; we need German assistance, both in geography and in 
military strength, if these can be obtained with justice and respect to them and to ourselves. It is 
because of reasons, of which the ones I have given are only a few, that I have come to believe 
that we should have a European Defense Force. But merely because I believe we must have a 
European Defense Force does not mean that I am stopping for one instant my efforts to cooperate 
with every one of the chiefs of Staff in all our countries to produce, now, what they can as 
effective national forces. But if we go ahead with the European Defense Force, gaining German 
strength without creating a menace to any others and in such a way that the Germans could 
cooperate with self-respect, our goals will become much more readily obtainable. Here I must 
say one word about the German position. We cannot have mere hirelings and expect them to 
operate efficiently. NATO has no use for soldiers representing a second-rate morale or a second-
rate country. German help will be tremendously important as it is freely given; and it can be so 
given, I believe, through a European Defense Force. This European Force would serve another 
great purpose it would stand alongside the Schuman Plan – which must be successful - and the 
two would constitute great steps toward the goal of complete European unity! Just as European 
unity is important to all of us, there is nothing more important to the entire NATO organization 
than an underlying unity among all of us based on a clear comprehension of the facts at issue. It 
is not enough that we here around this table agree on essentials. It is not enough that all of our 
governments agree. The important thing is that the populations standing behind those 
governments must agree. Our peoples must understand that, for each nation, the concept of 
collective security by cooperation must be successful or there is no acceptable alternative for any 
of us. All of us must understand that the task we have set for ourselves can be done because of 
our great resources and our determination and skill. All of us must understand that this task must 
take first priority over and above all else except only that of assuring acceptable levels of living 
in our own countries. Unless this kind of information is gotten out and understood, we are 
victims first of our own laziness, our own failures as leaders, and secondly we are victims of 
Soviet propaganda, because they will, in all cases assert the contrary. They will assert that we are 
trying to get together to launch a great invasion, when they well know that the entire aggregate of 
the forces we are talking about have no power to launch any attack across Europe. All soldiers 
know that it is an entirely different thing to establish a military stalemate in Western Europe on 
the one hand, and, on the other, to conduct an offensive. The Soviet General Staff is completely 
capable of understanding this. All of their verbal assaults and attacks against our motives are 
spurious. They know it and we know it; but the point is our populations everywhere must know 
that we are united for peace. During this past year, NATO has marshaled and organized under 
competent commanders and splendid staffs, such troops as we have. I believe they could already 
give a gallant account of themselves if attacked, even though we are far too weak to provide the 
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assured safety that we require. I might stop to observe that when your self-preservation demands 
the accomplishment of a job there is nothing that is impossible. The impossible then merely 
becomes a difficulty, something to be solved and something to be done. You don't give up when 
your life is at stake. So, even now, our troops are not helpless. There was a famous old cavalry 
general in my country who once had part of his force surrounded by overwhelming numbers. A 
message came through to him describing the terrible situation, and the query was, 'What shall we 
do’? The commander who was a bit illiterate sent back 'Fight ‘em’ and he spelled the message = 
'fitem.’ Now, if the balloon goes up today what we are going to do is fight, make no mistake 
about it. All of us would be doing the same. I repeat that aside from their immediately available 
and disposable military force, the only attribute in which the Soviets have a temporary advantage 
over us is in their unity. And that unity has this one defect. In time of crisis - when the fear of the 
machine gun behind the line loses its relative importance because of the danger in front - that 
kind of unity begins to fall apart. What we must do is to produce throughout our countries, the 
certainty, the knowledge that we can voluntarily build a unity that will win and secure the peace. 
My Chairman and Gentlemen, I assure you that it has been a very great honor to appear here 
with my staff to give you a few of the ideas and observations we have on this developing scene. 
And I assure you also that we are keenly sensible of the heavy responsibilities resting upon you 
Gentlemen. I tell you now, as a body, what I have frequently told you individually, whenever we 
meet with you it in the spirit of cooperation, in the confidence that we can attain NATO's goals 
of security and peace if we all do it together. 
 
6.8 Unidentified SHAPE Statement: 1952 
 
The past year at SHAPE has been very valuable: we have plowed difficult ground and 
established successfully the political, psychological and organizational foundations upon which 
to build. But this exercise must have made it very clear to you gentlemen that we must now get 
about the business of building the structure - the forces, the facilities, the command techniques, 
and the imaginative tactics that will make this organization an insuperable obstacle to any 
aggressor from the East. Air strength, Reserves, Logistics,  Training. We should quickly 
consummate arrangements for German participation in the framework for the European Army. 
You gentlemen from the participating nations can do much toward expediting the realization of 
this important goal. On this, a far-sighted view is essential, focusing on the major problems 
rather than on particular and minor difficulties. As you go back to your assignments, I think you 
will have gained an understanding and view of our security problem in its full dimensions, and as 
a joint endeavor in which all our forces are joined together for a common end. It has been a 
notable meeting - unique in composition and truly beneficial in result. NATO will profit much 
from it. I trust it will be repeated at least yearly. For me, it will probably be the last meeting of 
this sort. But whenever I depart, I shall feel a heavy burden of sadness on leaving this post. 
Almost certainly, it will be my last military command - and I need not tell you what that means 
to a man who has spent his complete adult life in uniform. Moreover, my feelings will be the 
more acute on departure from this continent with which much of my military career has been so 
closely associated. Were a man to choose his final post of military service, he could not have 
found a better one. The past year and a half has been a tremendously inspiring and rewarding 
experience for me. I have enjoyed and profited by the fullest cooperation from all of your 
governments and from every official in those governments. I have had the most sympathetic and 
understanding support at all times from the National Military chiefs. And I have had the support 
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and loyalty of one of the finest staffs it has ever been the honor of a soldier to lead. Behind us, all 
in the NATO countries have worked devotedly to make SHAPE a reality that could stand as a 
guardian for peace and justice. But I am sure there are plenty of critics and military experts who 
regard it as a military monstrosity - as something that could not live long among the strains and 
pressures that influence nations individually and collectively. These skeptics are perhaps fewer 
in numbers than they were a year ago, but they are still with us, voicing their dire predictions of 
eventual collapse. It is to us and specifically to you gentlemen, who must carry on, to prove that 
they are wrong. We shall not fail because we must not fail. It is true that a union among 
sovereign bodies is a very difficult thing to accomplish. If you take fourteen grains of sand on the 
seashore and put them in your hand and attempt to make a ball of them, you would not be trying 
anything more difficult than to get fourteen independent nations working together for a common 
purpose. But we do know that we can go to another part of the countryside, get a bit of rock, 
make some cement from it and then - out of those fourteen grains of sand - create something that 
is practically indestructible. By treaties alone, you cannot produce a unity among sovereign 
nations which will hold up in the emergency of war. You can write all the provisos, clauses, and 
conditions into a treaty, but when a nation's existence is at stake - when it believes that it may be 
in total danger by clinging to the provisions of this treaty - words will not be enough to hold it 
together. The force that will hold is mutual confidence. And as it grows and develops from the 
highest level of government to the soldier in ranks and the man in the street, there is finally 
produced something the strength of which is almost incalculable. We are building such a bond 
between us, and its growing strength is the hope of the free world. From Norway, through 
Western Europe and across the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, I have seen this unity growing – 
this feeling of common goals and common destiny. In the space of a year, I have seen hope 
return to faces that before were shadowed with worry and despair. With high courage, we have 
met thus far the challenge of history: in brotherhood we have joined to defend freedom. Now we 
must persevere - with pride in our task – and will through all obstacles to gain or peaceful and 
honorable ends. 
 
6.9 Address to Members of British Parliament: January 15, 1952 
 
Gentlemen, I am going to address you in particular capacity. As I see it, you are a part of the 
high command of the Free World, and it is in that way that I want to talk to you. In your hands 
are part of the decisions that must rule the fate, current and future, of that part of the world not 
now under the Iron curtain; and, more specifically, that part represented in NATO. 
Consequently, where others have talked to you about statistics of supply, the economies of 
various countries, the financial situation and production of munitions, I am going to speak more 
in the abstract in order to show you the motivation of this group here in SHAPE; and what we 
believe is, or, indeed I am bold enough to say, should be, representative of the attitude of twelve 
nations. We start with a very simple basis: It is success in this, or it is 'or else? for the Free 
World. Now that statement is not nearly so radical as it might sound at first. It stems from this: 
Given the interdependence of the modern world with its machines, its steel civilization, and the 
complex industrial fabric that is built up over the world, we find that there is no nation in the 
world which is capable of carrying on and operating successfully its economy by itself. At the 
same time that we have that situation, we have an announced enemy of any free system of 
government: The Communist doctrine states that it cannot co-exist with free governments. So, 
with that enemy, united by the power of the gun in the kidneys, arrayed against this Free World 
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in which actions must depend upon each other in order to exist, we find that there is no single 
one of these nations which can exist by itself; that can protect itself. This applies particularly to 
those that are close to the Iron Curtain. If we merely adopt the policy that we are not our 
brother's keeper and retire each unto himself and say, 'We'll make the most of what we've got and 
let it stand, we will find that, one by one, due to the many-sided nature of the Communist attack, 
the weaker countries will fall. The attack is not purely and strictly military. Equally important, 
and sometimes more effective, I think, is the threat of using the military. All of the free nations 
are involved in each other's problems in one way or another. Take the case of Indo-China. What 
would happen there if we should withdraw support of France completely? And then think of 
Siam, Malaya, Burma, in succession, and what would happen to India? And soon you see 
yourself in such a shrinking world that finally even great powers like the United States and Great 
Britain have to struggle for mere existence. So, from our point of view it is this 'or else. Produce 
collective security that can encompass us all. So we start from there. If we start from there, our 
next point is: All related, all ancillary problems are of no great importance to us. We represent 
that part of the decision of the high command that compels unified action. And so, in this 
headquarters - and I wish each of you could come back for informal visits, to go into each 
section, at your own sweet will, to visit them and see these men working together. There is no 
representation of any strictly nationalistic view in the solution of a problem. It is done 
professionally. The nationalistic views are represented on a level higher than we are. I mean, in 
bodies higher than we are. They are decided there and we get them. But, in this unification and 
the production of the power that is the objective, the production of, let us say, the peacekeeping 
power that is the objective of the NATO nations, there is one great truth that none of us must 
ever forget. It is this: This power for keeping the peace is not merely the sum of the moral, 
economic, and military strength you can develop. It is the product. And the reason that that is 
important, is this: Let any one of those three factors fall to zero, and the whole is zero. If you 
economic power falls to zero, if you're busted, then you have no power to support the Free 
World. If your military power falls to zero, you are nothing but a fat cat waiting to be knocked 
off. If your morale, or spiritual power falls to zero, you are useless. You are just of no account. 
So, in this business we find these three things have to be produced: Moral or spiritual, economic 
and military power. Now, the area with which we are most concerned, because of its great scope, 
is Western Continental Europe. I am not going to repeat what you must have heard about what 
would occur if we should lose Europe. There is nobody here who isn't completely alert to the 
extraordinary advantages that would accrue to us - if we should lose Europe. But how are we 
going to keep Europe, remembering that there must be a military power with an economy, viable 
economy, and can support that military power, and a spirit to keep it going. And these things are 
interrelated, and reciprocal, in their effect. The morale works on the military power, and the 
military power raises the morale. They are all intertwined. But we come to this basic factor in 
Western Europe: You must have a viable economy or you will have no security in this area. If 
you have no security in this area, we know what the whole effect would be on NATO; on our 
nations, our two maritime Atlantic nations. And so you can almost say there is a viable economy 
in Western Europe or, it's this 'or else. Now how are you going to produce a viable economy in 
Western Europe? You've got Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, other small nations; nations 
reduced, weakened by the war, competing with each other - not merely competing with the 
British economy and the American economy, but competing with each other in trying to make a 
living. All the Marshall Plan help in the world, in my mind, will never put Europe, Western 
Europe, that has had its old trade route and trade connections with Eastern Europe - with its 
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bread-basket - cut off - you're never going to have a viable economy until you get rid of these 
little artificial separations and make Western Europe a federated unity, certainly to the extent of 
federating its economy and, therefore, many or most of its political decisions. We therefore come 
to this fact: If you don't produce a federated Western Europe, you are never going to get a long-
term cure for the threat now overwhelming the world unless, of course, there should be an 
internal collapse within the countries posing that threat, a circumstance for which we may 
devoutly pray, but which we cannot expect too suddenly; it is probably too big to have it happen 
suddenly. Within that framework, then, we say, 'Now let us produce the forces. And we run into 
another factor. Western Europe itself is shallow geographically. There is little depth in which to 
produce a defense. Instantly, your eyes turn to Germany because of the depth which it provides 
geographically to your defense. Also, your minds turn toward the Germans because most of us 
here have certain reasons to respect their fighting prowess, and we would like them on our side. 
And we know Western Germany is not going to remain a vacuum. And, in the same way, every 
needle is going to point to one of the poles. And, in the same way, every country in the world has 
to make up its mind, as long as power has become polarized; are you going to cling to the Free 
World concept, or are you going to accept without protest the authoritarian rule? To get that 
power into Western Europe, that strength of the Germans - and remember we also know that 
finally we have to produce a political entity here - the European Army has been devised. I know 
you have been discussing this issue today with a number of people, and I am therefore not going 
into any details about it. I would simply say this: If you don't like the European Army, propose 
an answer that will meet this situation. But don't, when you do it, try to duck around and get 
away from the basic alternatives there are for a proper and satisfactory solution of this problem. I 
think you will come to the type of conclusion to which a leader in war often has to come; he 
brings up two or three plans, and since the function of the staff is always to point out the risks 
and the dangers, soon he has the sum of the negatives that are applied to each one, and every one 
becomes impossible. But if you don't do one of them, you are going to lose the war. So you have 
just got to go to work. We have reasoned ourselves down to these basic truths: First, it is NATO 
'or else?; next, it is a unified Western Europe 'or else?; and fitting into that picture comes the 
strength of Western Germany, which means for the present a European Army 'or else’, which fits 
into the other concept. And we see no way of ducking it. Now I have just one aphorism, probably 
an aphorism, and it is not very profound, and it is that: When there comes a problem in human 
affairs that is a must, that is compulsory, then, gentlemen, there are no impossibilities. From that 
time on there are only obstacles to be overcome. If you are drowning in the middle of the river 
you don't say 'I can't swim as far as the shore’, you just swim. At least, you don't give up. That's 
where we are. I can set before you, in my mind, what seemed to be the accomplishments of the 
past year, the progress we have made on the rocky road towards the ideals, the objectives, the 
aims we are trying to reach. I can show you where have been the discouragements, the setbacks. 
But this group remembers what we have to accomplish. We have been given a job by twelve 
countries and we intend to do it. 
 
6.10 Remarks at Academy of Moral and Political Sciences:  January 21, 1952 
 
I deeply appreciate the great honor of being received as a foreign associate of the Academy of 
Moral and Political Sciences of the historic Institute of France. This is the third occasion in my 
military career when I have been serving in France, and I am particularly happy that 
circumstances have made it possible for me to be with you today. Here at this ancient seat of 
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culture and learning, whence the genius of the French people has shone forth for so many 
centuries, I feel especially conscious of the role of France and her people in the past, in the 
present and in the future. History and destiny, tradition and geography, have combined through 
the years to focus the eye of people all over the world on this great land. They look to France as a 
beacon of freedom and progress along the long and arduous road towards human happiness. 
They look to France for the leadership and vision which she has so often given mankind. The 
freedom loving peoples of the world have now embarked on a great collective effort to preserve 
those things which make life worth living. We can succeed in this great endeavor only if each 
and every one of us is willing to give the full measure of courage, sacrifice, work and vision; not 
in a divided effort, but working together in the pursuit of our common goal. In so doing, we are 
undertaking a task of a scope never before seen in peacetime, even during the three centuries of 
the existence of this ancient institution. We do not know what the precise solutions are, but we 
do know that we cannot succeed unless we are united. We do know that our purpose is a just and 
moral one, for we seek only peace with freedom. This endeavor must be exerted in every field, 
for the fabric of security is made up of the will to preserve our heritage, and the readiness to 
make any sacrifice therefore. There is hardly a political decision in the international field that 
does not have some security aspects; and similarly, there are few high-level military decisions 
which do not necessarily have profound moral, political and economic implications. A world 
which has suffered so much in recent years wants peace. It is the challenge of our time to win 
that peace. We can meet this challenge only if we work together, each one of us striving to do a 
little more than the other to achieve our common goal. The building of security which will give 
us peace is the business of all, for freedom itself is at stake. The work of this academy, defining 
and holding before us these eternal moral values, is the most precious contribution to the cause 
of free men. In this task, I know that France, which has contributed so much to the cause of 
human progress in the past, will prove herself worthy of the glorious heritage which is hers. 
 
6.11 2
nd
 Anniversary of SHAPE: April 2, 1952 
 
Three years ago this week, representatives of our several nations signed the treaty that set up 
NATO. Sometime later, recognizing the special situation of Western Europe and their purpose of 
maintaining security of the Western World, they decided to place the forces already raised under 
a single command, and so SHAPE was born. One year ago today, this Headquarters assumed 
operational command of the troops actually stationed in Europe for the defense of this great area. 
The purpose of our governments was a very simple one - to retain the peace through 
establishment of a sound collective security. This purpose was in complete conformity with the 
spirit and intent of the United Nations Organization - a regional pact to maintain the peace. The 
Organization of all of these independent countries to establish a military organization was, of 
course, a rather complicated sort of thing to do. They had many tasks to achieve before their 
objectives could be attained. As we proceed along the path toward the attainment of objectives 
that reach into our spiritual, our economic and our military activity, progress sometimes seems 
distressingly slow. Only this week, my staff and I have prepared a report on the progress we have 
achieved. One of its purposes will be to fight any discouragement that might come about from 
the realization that objectives are still a long way off on the horizon - by glancing briefly over 
our shoulders to see how far we have come. As in all things human, this report will be neither 
wholly white nor wholly black. We have had our discouragements, just as we have had our 
important advances. On the discouraging side, for example, we have had the strained economies 
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in Europe developing, threatening and slowing previously predicted schedules. We know that, in 
spite of the expenditure of vast sums of money in the United States and elsewhere, the flow of 
equipment has not been so rapid as previously predicted. In Korea, Indo-China and Malaya, 
NATO nations of Europe and in America are carrying very heavy burdens; burdens that are 
costly, both in blood and in treasure. They have a direct effect upon our efforts here to establish a 
secure defensive arrangement in Western Europe. On the encouraging side, there has been 
almost a revolutionary rise in the morale of the armed forces. Their training is efficient, directed 
by some of the most experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen alive today. In each case, in each 
unit, there is a growing confidence that they can do their job - do the job that they have been 
given by our United Nations. Another encouraging factor has been the accretion of turkey and 
Greece to our organization. These two sturdy, self-reliant nations have joined us in the same 
spirit that others have displayed - to maintain peace through development of a collective security 
organization. At last, ladies and gentlemen, the great productive machinery of the Western World 
is beginning to roll. Equipment is being produced at a much faster rate than has been the case 
over the past many months. It is to be anticipated that this will encourage and allow speed-up in 
the organization of military units. A very important, possibly the most important single 
encouraging factor of the past year, has been the progress toward centralization and unification 
in Western Europe. We have had the Schuman Plan, soon to go into operation. We have had 
evidence of the nation’s trying to get together through agriculture and electric power and similar 
types of economic activities. Finally, we have the European Defense Force, an arrangement 
whereby German strength can be brought into the Western Security Organization with full status 
of respectability for Germany and without endangering the peace of Western Europe. It will bind 
together a single economic, political whole, to make the peace of this region secure and safe. 
Along with this, there is strong hope that a permanent peace treaty will soon be signed between 
Germany and the three Western Powers. We here at SHAPE, representatives of many nations, 
work day by day constantly with these intricate and difficult problems. We have absolute faith 
that you can do the job. Of course you can do the job. All that is necessary is that each country 
remember that its own enlightened self-interest is served best by developing the common 
security so necessary to us all. The task, incident to it, must have first priority. We require faith, 
self-confidence, devotion, and tenacity - always tenacity. 
 
6.12 Farewell Address Paris, France: May 21, 1952 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, I am certainly in a unique position. You know, you are my bosses and 
usually one does not go around giving good advice and lecturing to his bosses, so I will try today 
to avoid being in the position of teacher or preacher. I shall try to tell you, in my own way, 
something of what I think of this Group, something of my respect for its opportunities for 
service, its capacity for good in the world today. Primarily, I believe this is the only body in the 
whole free world that is meeting day-by-day and studying objectively the real issues, the real 
problems, that are of concern to all of us. Those problems involve our freedoms as individuals - 
the rights that came to us when we were born in the image of God. Fundamentally, this is what 
you are dealing with and you are the only Group that is meeting and dispassionately studying the 
problem all the way from its material aspects such as making a living for ourselves and 
producing the strength to protect that living, to the challenge of growing culturally, intellectually, 
spiritually throughout our whole lives. Now, because I have the deep conviction that you people 
have a mission of such transcendent importance to the free world, I likewise feel that it is going 
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to take courage on your part to discharge it effectively and properly. I realize, of course, that 
each of the members of the Council - the principals, the ones that have to bear the responsibility - 
each of you has a certain relationship with your own government, which is a sovereign nation, 
and that you have to present views in certain meetings that are not necessarily your own views. 
In such cases you have to present the opinion and conviction or the decision of your government, 
but thank God that is only part of your work. As intelligent men studying the great problems 
before our community, you not only have the opportunity but, in my humble opinion, you have 
the duty of reaching conclusions and convictions based on your own intelligence, your own heart 
and your own beliefs. And, moreover, I believe that you really have the duty once in a while in 
telling your own country, your own government, this fact, because I repeat, there is no one who 
can possibly have the opportunity to study these subjects as dispassionately, as objectively, as the 
members of this Group. In talking to you today I could recite experiences of the past year which 
would illustrate the very fine cooperation and support that we have received from the civilian 
sections of NATO. Such sentiments would be very sincere and, of course, they are rather 
characteristic of such occasions as this when some associate or member of an Organization is 
leaving. However, I think you know how cordial our association has been. I think that you, like 
those at SHAPE, have been animated by the same passionate hope of serving free humanity, of 
making it secure, of gaining ground toward that level of security where we can devote our 
income, our resources, our productivity to the good of people. We should soon like to reach that 
point where we do not have to divert so much of our national incomes into the profitless, sterile, 
negative means that we call military formations. It is a Group such as yours that can possibly do 
more to preserve that balance between what is necessary in a world threatened by evil, and what 
we must earnestly try to do in a more constructive direction, more in keeping with the ideals for 
which free government was set up. Now I realize when discussing such subjects before a body 
like this, that I am talking to people who in their intellectual and scholarly attainments can take 
the same subject and make something eloquent out of it. The only thing that I can maintain as I 
stand before you is that no one could believe more than I in the rights and privileges of free 
people. I believe also that they have it within their capacity to hold their freedom if each will 
meet his just obligations and duties. In the free world, the accumulated combined resources are 
such that it sometimes appears that we are foolish, practically ridiculous, to be frightened of any 
force in the world. Our one trouble is that we are not united; we too much enjoy the special 
prejudices and suspicions that keep us apart. Now the Communist uses the gun in the kidneys - a 
knife between the shoulder blades - and of course people are unified or else they do not exist. We 
have to find better ways. One of the ways is this body and I can see the development of 
friendship, understanding, unity as a primary job of you gentlemen who stand in the front row 
and bear heavy responsibilities. You have got a great organization. It's going to be far more 
numerous than SHAPE pretty soon! Everybody in that organization can do something - in their 
letters home; in all their communications with people throughout the world; in their day by day 
meetings. We can do this thing, and we can produce something close to that described by a great 
American President, Woodrow Wilson. He said, 'The highest form of efficiency is the 
spontaneous cooperation of a free people? Now, if you will simply take the expression 'free 
people? and make it plural instead of singular I believe you will have the slogan, the watchword, 
the objective, that should guide everybody associated with this kind of an effort. I should hope 
that I would not be out of place, Lord Ismay, in just making one simple pledge before I say my 
final goodbye. Wherever I am, whatever I shall be doing, I shall never lose my faith, my 
conviction, in the essential truth of what I have been trying to say to you just now. I shall 
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continue to work in that direction conscious that we must – quickly as is possible - get out of the 
strictly military business here and get into something that is more profitable for us as a whole - 
more in keeping, as I say, with our culture and our purposes of our type of civilization. With that 
pledge, I hope that I have established a fact that with this body and with everybody in it I shall 
always be warmly associated in heart even if I am not here to clasp your hand - goodbye. 
